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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on eight cities in the Model Cities Program and the effects of the program on national urban policy and the ability of cities and counties to cope with urban problems. The cities (Boston, Chicago, Dayton, Indianapolis, Newark, New York, Savannah, and Seattle) were chosen not only for their geographic and population representativeness, but also because they were reported to be making some noticeable impact on their communities. However, these few cities have been used only as a base for an analysis of the full program. Findings of studies conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and others (plus other studies done by the author) involving as little as one city and as many as all 147 cities in the Model Cities Program, are used for comparative purposes, to confirm or qualify some points. The document is in the form of eight case studies and deals with the major components of the Model Cities Program and what impact they have had on relieving urban problems in each area. Its focus is on the operation of local general government and how this has been affected by the objectives, organization, and methods imposed by the Model Cities Program. The overall analysis is a synthesis of these experiences and how they have measured up to the program's main objectives. (Author/JM)

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MODEL CITIES IMPACT ON BETTER COMMUNITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

93d Congress, First Session

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DECEMBER 1973

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LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

DECEMBER 10, 1973.

To All Members of the Committee on Banking and Currency:

I hereby transmit for the use of the Committee on Banking and Currency the paper submitted to the Subcommittee on Housing entitled, "Model Cities Impact on Better Communities," prepared by Mr. George J. Washnis of the Center for Governmental Studies. This paper provides Members of the Committee with an extensive analysis of the model cities program. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of any of the Members of the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Sincerely,

WRIGHT PATMAN, *Chairman.*

NOVEMBER 27, 1973.

HON. WRIGHT PATMAN,
Chairman, House Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed for your consideration is an excellent report authored by Mr. George J. Washnis of the Center for Governmental Studies entitled, "Model Cities Impact on Better Communities."

The report examines the Model Cities Program in its totality, as well as the specific experience of eight individual cities. I believe that the views expressed in the report with respect to planning processes, management and coordination techniques, citizen participation and program results would be of great value to the Committee in its consideration of community development block grant legislation.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM A. BARRETT,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing.

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FOREWORD

For more than a third of a century, the federal government has given aid to cities to make improvements in older, rundown neighborhoods. The Housing Act of 1937 started a public housing program with a triple purpose of new housing for the poor, jobs for the unemployed, and demolition of slums. The Housing Act of 1949 started a redevelopment program with federal subsidy for slum clearance leading to a variety of new land uses. The Housing Act of 1954 introduced urban renewal to the lexicon, provided assistance for neighborhood rehabilitation, and required cities to have a workable program for community improvement.

The nineteen-sixties saw greater emphasis upon social renewal of the inner city through a set of demonstration projects funded by the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and then through the Community Action Program. By the mid-sixties city and federal officials became convinced of the necessity of marrying programs of social and physical improvement, and this notion was embodied in the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1965, which created what became known as the Model Cities Program. It took a year to select cities and another year or more to plan local programs and obtain federal funding, but now a few cities are in their fifth action year and many more in their fourth. As the demonstration period draws to a close, Congress is considering consolidating Model Cities, Urban Renewal, and several other programs into an even more comprehensive community development program.

As this newest stage of evolution occurs, it is important to assess what has been learned from the Model Cities Program. This is what George J. Washnis does in this report, which looks at the program in its totality and the experience of eight cities with specificity. His conclusions about planning processes, management and coordination techniques, citizen participation, and the product expressed in terms of program results, all of these are relevant to the design and implementation of a nationally supported, locally administered community development program. As a former city administrator, he adds his practical knowledge of how to get things done.

In the conduct of this study, Camille Cates made a significant contribution to the case studies, and Judy Chavkin served as an editorial assistant. Local reporters provided valuable information from the eight cities studied: Elliot Friedman (Boston), William Hood and Thomas Gray (Chicago), Denise Goodman (Dayton), Jim Hetherington (Indianapolis), Larry Hall and Peter Bridge (Newark), Josh Friedmen and Wayne Barrett (New York), Neal Baker (Savannah), and Hilda Bryant (Seattle).

However, the conclusions and recommendations reflect the views of the author and are not necessarily those of the Ford Foundation or the board of directors of the Center for Governmental Studies.

HOWARD W. HALLMAN,
President.

PREFACE

This study focuses on eight cities in the Model Cities Program and the effects of the program on national urban policy and the ability of cities and counties to cope with urban problems. The cities (Boston, Chicago, Dayton, Indianapolis, Newark, New York, Savannah and Seattle) were chosen not only for their geographic and population representativeness, but also because they were reported to be making some noticeable impact on their communities, whether positive or negative in nature. However, these few cities have been used only as a base for an analysis of the full program. Findings of studies conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and others (plus other studies done by the author) involving as little as one city and as many as all 147 cities in the Model Cities Program, are used for comparative purposes, to confirm or qualify some points.

The body of the manuscript is in the form of eight case studies and deals with the major components of the Model Cities Program and what impact they have had on relieving urban problems in each area. Its focus is on the operation of local general government and how this has been affected by the objectives, organization and methods imposed by the Model Cities Program. The overall analysis is a synthesis of these experiences and how they have measured up to the program's main objectives, which include such things as program demonstration and innovation, coordination and comprehensive planning, concentration and commitment of resources, citizen involvement, and service improvement. The evaluation and effect of new programs—Planned Variations, special revenue sharing, Better Communities, block grants—are compared to Model Cities, which we believe has been the genesis for many of the new ideas.

The full report of this study has been republished in book form under the title *Community Development Strategies: Case Studies of Major Model Cities.*

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MODEL CITIES IMPACT ON BETTER COMMUNITIES

(By George J. Washnis, Center for Governmental Studies, Washington, D.C.)

I. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The Model Cities Program has been the single most effective instrument for providing local officials with the means and motivation to give the broadest range of services to disadvantaged areas and to improve local government operations. It has had a more profound effect on changing local government operations than other federal programs because it has primarily worked within local government systems and has brought on strong resident influence with it.

2. Contrary to the belief of many, Model Cities has been the federal program with the least federal interference in local problem definition and priority setting. It has given local officials and citizens in 147 cities almost complete discretionary authority over the types of programs and the amount of money to be spent. It is doubtful whether special revenue sharing or other forms of block grants will, in themselves, provide greater opportunity for local decision-making. However, they will extend this ability citywide, as has been done through Planned Variations, an expansion of Model Cities concepts citywide in 20 cities.

3. The federal commitment—in resources or the talent necessary to fulfill the goals and objectives of the program—was never realized. The limitation of funds was greatly accentuated because of the requirement to develop comprehensive plans. Too little federal money was spread among too many cities, and funds in almost every city were spread sparingly among too many programs. The effect has been failure to reach massive impact in any functional program area.

4. Although comprehensiveness contributed to underfunding, it has been useful because it has required city officials to experiment with new programs and expand proven programs in almost every functional area, such as health, employment, education, criminal justice, social services, municipal services, etc. Because of its usefulness in helping to achieve more effective coordination and to develop whole information systems, comprehensiveness should be retained as a planning requirement and there should be continued emphasis on local experimentation (project innovation and demonstration) in all program areas. Rather than eliminating comprehensive systems, they should be improved to collect and maintain accurate human resource data in a central municipal source so that planning technicians do not have to continually guess prevailing conditions and so that projections may be improved.

5. The requirement to use all resources in disadvantaged areas has been beneficial to the poor; however, it has restricted the ability to coordinate programs and has hindered the development of citywide objectives and cooperation from the community at-large. Planned Variations is a more desirable approach: first, to continue concentration

of the majority of resources in the most needy areas, but secondly, to apportion funds citywide to help solve the city's broad problems and to develop sound management techniques and service effectiveness for the entire city. Community development legislation should require that the majority of funds be spent for the benefit of the most depressed areas in each city and county. Without such stipulation, it is doubtful whether the problems of the poor will ever be adequately addressed. It is not enough that distribution formulas allocate money to whole cities and counties based on poverty factors. Legislation should make priorities of need within localities clear as well.

6. Budgets for the proposed Better Communities Act and other community development legislation now before Congress will have the effect of maintaining the status quo for most urban areas, reducing funds for others, and increasing funds in some newly participating communities. Because of the great needs of cities and counties, funds should not only be kept at present levels in all localities which are using them properly, but increased in many. The formula for the distribution of funds should be based on need and reflection of the real conditions of poverty. The distribution formula in the Better Communities Act does not reflect the truest poverty indices and would have the effect of passing money to some communities which have a low priority for community development type activities. The expenditure of community development funds should reflect national priorities. The amount each community gets should not only be based on need but on plans localities submit of how they intend to meet community goals and national priorities.

7. "Maintenance of effort" should be required in any new community development legislation so that cities and counties do not replace local tax effort with federal money and merely maintain the status quo. In addition, there should be some state and local matching requirements for community development funds so that local interest and commitment are maintained. This should also have the effect of increasing the amount of money expended for community development purposes in contrast to more traditional uses.

8. Excessive red-tape and paperwork requirements have been a principal fault of the Model Cities Program, although Planned Variations has reduced this burden by as much as two-thirds. Block grants, minimum application and reporting requirements, and post-audits would have the effect of reducing requisites to tolerable levels. However, officials should not regard the development and maintenance of comprehensive plans, information systems, and evaluation as synonomous with delay and red tape. These are natural parts of any community's realistic planning and goal setting and are best designed to reduce costs and prevent delays over the long run.

9. The excellent experience of evaluating projects in the Model Cities process should be expanded to all community development activities. Many local and federal evaluation techniques need improvement. Yet there are many which have proved valuable. Local government has not made a regular practice of evaluating all local services, except by means of a more superficial budget review process. The Model Cities evaluation experience should be passed on to other city and county departments. Furthermore, federal evaluation of local government should carry more stringent guidelines for enforcement and compliance with stated community objectives.

10. In many cases, Model Cities initiated successful steps toward improving intergovernmental cooperation and program coordination. Representatives from private and state agencies have joined to discuss community goals and to prevent overlapping and duplicate programming. In a number of cases, standing intergovernmental task forces have been formed, sanctioned by laws or executive orders and composed of top state and regional officials. Nevertheless, there are extreme jealousies among agencies and much more formalized and effective coordinating mechanisms are needed. Federal regional councils are helping to achieve federal coordination. State regional councils with authority to plan and allocate resources are also needed in the more complex urban areas. Model Cities, from its small geographic area, cannot be expected to achieve a high degree of coordination. Planned Variations will not succeed much further without full state cooperation.

11. There has been a notable lack of cooperation from private groups, particularly business and unions. This has resulted from the inability of these groups to identify their memberships and organizational objectives with the needs of the inner city poor. There has also been discouragement by militant and self-interested "community spokesmen" and simply lack of encouragement from local Model Cities officials. The maturing of the citizen board process and greater concern for citywide objectives are encouraging more private response. Model Cities experience has shown that private initiative and resources are necessary to fully develop the community's potential.

12. Model Cities has operated largely under the guidance of local general government in varying degrees of partnership between model neighborhood residents and city officials. This process has had greater effect on influencing operations and changing established procedures of local government than have programs which have operated largely outside general government. It has caused local government to evaluate seriously many of its programs, change city hiring practices, expand regular services to disadvantaged areas, institute social service planning, and become a leader in coordinating other agencies. And Planned Variations has taken this process a step further by going citywide.

13. Processes such as A-95 (local clearinghouse for federal programs), Annual Arrangements (priority and resource determination), Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC—a strengthening of the chief executive's review authority), Planned Variations, integrated (federal-local) financial and information systems, consolidated funding, and other management improvements have been natural evolutions from the Model Cities experience. Although Model Cities has not been able to take more than the initial steps nor will it have the opportunity to do so in its present state, it has been the principal catalyst. This is evident from the fact that few cities outside the Model Cities Program have advanced in these techniques.

14. The flexible use of Model Cities funds has been one of its chief assets. The ability to "buy into" other agencies (under contractual arrangements), by offering funds for new or expanded programming, has enabled Model Cities to secure important changes in agency operations. Moreover, any block grant program should not be so stringent that it eliminates the advantages of the flexible and catalytic use of federal money.

15. Model Cities has achieved some degree of innovation and institutional change. Innovations have included such things as model schools, non-profit corporations, neighborhood health centers, multi-service centers, decisionmaking by the poor, less restrictive hiring procedures for minorities, increased employment of minorities in local government, new and improved services to disadvantaged areas, improved city management techniques, and an increased involvement of elected officials in the problems of the poor. However, Model Cities has only taken the first few steps, and further action along these lines is essential.

16. Perhaps Model Cities' most notable achievements have been in improving the processes of local government, including management, coordination, citizen involvement, and planning techniques. Yet, there have been improvements in product as well. Services have been improved in most model areas. And the number of clients using facilities is gradually increasing. Better programming and public acceptance have meant an improved cost-benefit ratio. Although Model Cities has not reached its high "quality of life" goals and many individual programs are failures, this does not call for the flat abandonment of all programs but rather careful analysis, elimination of unsatisfactory projects, and improvement of the others.

17. Citizen participation has been perhaps the most innovative force in the Model Cities Program and to local general government. Its innovation has been not so much in programing, but in changing the attitudes of local officials, the ways they make decisions, and in alerting other community groups of the need to involve themselves in government decisionmaking. Although some citizen boards have delayed or damaged some projects, others have improved government service, communication, and community development. The good far outweighs the bad. Because some cities have not been able to develop a satisfactory participation process does not necessarily mean that meaningful citizen involvement is impossible but rather that city officials have not yet found the correct ingredients for success. In this regard, community development legislation should require active citizen participation and provide the necessary resources for it. It should permit neighborhood groups not only to participate in decisionmaking but to operate some programs. The operation of programs has the effect of increasing citizen board interest, responsibility, and longevity.

II. Overall Assessment

Origins

Many of the principles which have formed the basis of the Model Cities Program have been a natural extension of past urban programs, and many of these concepts will be continued in new programs. The idea for the Model Cities Program came out of a Presidential Task Force on Urban Problems, appointed in 1965 and chaired by Robert C. Wood (who later became undersecretary of HUD). This Task Force drew on lessons learned in such urban programs as urban renewal, juvenile delinquency, community action, and others, but also sought significant program innovation. Congress enacted the legislation in the fall of 1966, and at the bill signing ceremony President Lyndon Johnson conferred the name Model Cities on the new program.

Compared to previous programs there would be greater emphasis on basic management concepts, such as planning and coordination, evaluation, and demonstration of new techniques. The most important additions were ideas of program comprehensiveness, meaningful citizen involvement, and flexible money—the latter which could be used for almost any purpose. And as lessons were learned from Model Cities, they were adopted or proposed for community development and special revenue sharing legislation.

Yet, as a practical matter, the urban mind has not changed very much from the desire to tinker with basic management principles, regardless of how programs have been designed. The most significant bottleneck has always been finding the right sets of people with the right motivations to make things work.

Decisions: A Local Responsibility

Contrary to the belief of many, the Model Cities Program has worked well in a great number of cities. One of the reasons it has succeeded where it has is because the right sets of people have come together, properly motivated and willing to compromise yet preserve its principles. It is important to note that the success or failure of the program has always rested with local officials, inasmuch as they were given the decision-making authority to develop their own strategies and priorities.

Indeed, there was plenty of federal red tape, requirements for voluminous reports, monthly evaluations, and time-consuming citizen participation. In spite of this, numerous cities moved directly ahead to design their own organization and programs in order to meet the needs of their communities as best they could with the resources available, as the legislation intended. Procedural requirements were just another step which had to be coped with. While many cities complained about federal intervention, others (including most cities in this study) found their way through the bureaucratic muddle to the real purposes of the program. And once having mastered the federal process, these cities were content to live with it and even stop griping, although they have naturally all preferred greater simplicity.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the complex process did not seriously impede programming in well administered cities. Administrative costs turned out to be considerably higher than normal and an additional bureaucracy was created at the central levels; yet the operation of services has taken place rather independently in the field, much as they do in any other program. This is no argument for complexity, only that it should not be used as an excuse for the failure of a whole Model Cities Program.

Early in 1972, Floyd Hyde, then head of the federal Model Cities and Community Development Programs and now undersecretary of HUD, emphasized the local role by declaring to a group of mayors, "Let me make it clear, priority setting was yours (cities)."[1]

Model Cities has always given local officials the responsibility to determine their own programs, who would run them, and how they would be operated. There is no indication that under special revenue sharing, now being considered as a replacement for Model Cities, better decisions will be made. Some programs may be consolidated and emphasis changed, but a great deal of this has already occurred under Planned Variations and Model Cities programs. In fact, the new decision-making could very well be less concerned about doing things for the disadvantaged, in housing and human resources particularly.

Commitment: Never There

Neither the Congress nor the federal bureaucracies ever really committed the necessary resources to the Model Cities Program. For the most part projects could only be funded piecemeal, with only part of the problem addressed. Washington politics also hurt Model Cities.

The original intention was to limit the experiment to six or eight cities in order to heighten the impact of the money to be spent. However, political reality meant that a larger number of cities would have to be chosen, enough to award one to almost every state and to some small cities as well for rural oriented Congressmen. Moreover, many of the cities and counties were selected to gain political support for the Administration rather than for the quality of their proposals. And a few cities were required to spend only a few weeks in preparing their applications of acceptance in contrast to the majority which had to labor for a year or more in a tedious, qualifying planning process.

The political process expanded the Model Cities Program to 150 cities (See Tables I and II for cities and population ranges, Pages 8 and 9), seriously diluting the impact funds would have on each city and immeasurably increasing the responsibility and scope of the federal supervisory role, which would add to the program's delay.

There was not enough funds to seriously address the problems of even a small number of cities, let alone 150. Moreover, the bulk of money was supposed to come from existing programs in other federal agencies with Model Cities supplying the basic working capital needed to tie programs together in complete packages for each functional area and at the same time fill all the gaps. HUD's assistant secretary at that time, H. Ralph Taylor, recognized the funding problems but characterized Model Cities as an experiment to test the will and com-

[1] Model Cities-Planned Variations Conference sponsored by the National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors, Tucson, Arizona, February 24–25, 1972.

petence of communities to meet the problems of slums, in spite of the irrationality of the pipeline through which federal funds were poured. The new flexible financing—performing much like a block grant—was designed to grease the federal pipeline and at the same time make mayors "bolder and freer" in attacking human and physical blight. In some ways this happened, but the impenetrable federal bureaucracy was never fully cracked, and each agency participated only to the extent it had to. Jealousies and tradition prevailed, and no agency was willing to give up a great deal of funds or control to any new program. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was the principal exception to this but it, too, held tightly to its reins.

As the years wore on, federal and local officials in many parts of the country angrily attributed the immobility of Model Cities to the lack of commitment and fancied what could have taken place if only a small number of cities had received the funds. Cities like New York got $65 million annually from Model Cities compared to its 1973 $10 billion city budget; Boston $7.7 million compared to a $486 million city budget; Chicago $38 million compared to a $899 million city budget. The medium-sized cities fared better, getting as much as a third or more of their regular city budgets. At least two small cities received more than their city budgets and were able to make considerable progress. Alma-Bacon County, Georgia, has been one of these cities. With a population of a little over 8,000, it is an example of a real success story, largely due to the catalytic action of some $1.2 million of Model Cities funds annually.[1]

Most cities never received the necessary funds to reach the critical mass, enough to overturn urban blight. Nor have many of these cities been able to maintain what they started. In many cases, mini-parks sit in disrepair among scattered debris and broken equipment; Head Start is bogged down over lack of funds to carry the learning experience into higher grades; new housing sits in the middle of a sea of destitution and deterioration; and job training is tagged useless without jobs at the end. There is no question that the failure of many individual programs is due to poor management; on the other hand, there are successful programs which have fallen by the wayside, submerged in other massive need. There are also programs which continue to be successful.

TABLE I.—*Original Model Cities Participants*

ALABAMA	CALIFORNIA
Huntsville	Berkeley
Tuskegee	Compton
ALASKA	Fresno
Juneau	Los Angeles City
ARKANSAS	Los Angeles County
Little Rock	Oakland
Texarkana	Pittsburg
ARIZONA	Richmond
	San Diego
Gila River Indian Community	San Francisco
Tucson	San Jose

[1] *The Alma-Bacon County Story—A Model for Rural America*, Robert E. Nipp, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate, July 24, 1973, U.S. Government Printing Office.

TABLE 1.—*Original Model Cities Participants*—Continued

COLORADO

Denver
Trinidad

CONNECTICUT

Bridgeport
Hartford
New Haven
New London
Waterbury

DELAWARE

Wilmington

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FLORIDA

Dade County
Tampa

GEORGIA

Alma
Athens
Atlanta
Gainesville
Savannah

HAWAII

Honolulu

IDAHO

Boise

ILLINOIS

Carbondale
Chicago
East St. Louis
Rock Island

INDIANA

Gary
Indianapolis
South Bend

IOWA

Des Moines

KANSAS

Kansas City
Wichita

KENTUCKY

Bowling Green
Covington
Pikeville

LOUISIANA

New Orleans

MAINE

Lewiston
Portland

MARYLAND

Baltimore
Prince Georges County

MASSACHUSETTS

Boston
Cambridge
Fall River
Holyoke
Lowell
Lynn
New Bedford
Springfield
Worcester

MICHIGAN

Ann Arbor
Benton Harbor
Detroit
Genesee County (Flint)
Grand Rapids
Highland Park
Lansing
Saginaw

MINNESOTA

Duluth
Minneapolis
St. Paul

MISSOURI

Kansas City
St. Louis

MONTANA

Butte
Helena

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Manchester

NEW JERSEY

East Orange
Hoboken
Jersey City
Newark
Paterson
Perth Amboy
Plainfield
Trenton

NEW MEXICO

Albuquerque
Santa Fe

NEW YORK

Binghamton
Buffalo
Cohoes
Mt. Vernon
New York City; Central and East Harlem; South Bronx; Central Brooklyn
Poughkeepsie
Rochester
Syracuse

NORTH CAROLINA

Asheville
Charlotte
High Point
Winston Salem

NORTH DAKOTA

Fargo

OHIO

Akron
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbus
Dayton
Martins Ferry
Toledo
Youngstown

OKLAHOMA

Lawton
McAllister
Tulsa

TABLE I.—*Original Model Cities Participants*—Continued

OREGON

Portland

PENNSYLVANIA

Allegheny County
Bradford
Erie
Lancaster
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Reading
Scranton
Wilkes Barre

PUERTO RICO

San Juan

RHODE ISLAND

Pawtucket
Providence

SOUTH CAROLINA

Rock Hill
Spartanburg

TENNESSEE

Chattanooga
Cookeville
Nashville—Davidson County
Smithville—DeKalb County

TEXAS

Austin
Eagle Pass
Edinburg
Houston
Laredo
Texarkana
San Antonio
Waco

UTAH

Salt Lake County

VERMONT

Winooski

VIRGINIA

Norfolk
Richmond

WASHINGTON

Tacoma
Seattle

WISCONSIN

Milwaukee

WYOMING

Cheyenne

Source: National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors, June 1971.

As of June 20, 1972, $1.7 billion was received by the 147 cities in the program and $866 million expended. The Administration proposes that unexpended funds from fiscal years 1972 and 1973 be carried over into fiscal year 1974 to fill the gap of zero 1974 appropriation.

TABLE II

Population range	Cities	Cities approved
Over 1,000,000	6	6
750,000 to 1,000,000	5	4
500,000 to 750,000	17	15
250,000 to 500,000	27	20
100,000 to 250,000	84	37
50,000 to 100,000	232	29
25,000 to 50,000	476	13
10,000 to 25,000	1,165	16
5,000 to 10,000	1,171	6
1,000 to 5,000	15,054	1
Total		147

Source: Community Development, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1973.

Concentration and Comprehensiveness

Concentrating in Target Areas.—The Model Cities administrators at HUD believed that comprehensive programming and the effects of commitment could best take place with a requirement to concentrate Model Cities efforts in small areas of each city, usually about ten percent of the population or 15,000 inhabitants, whichever was greater. But this had the effect of sowing many seeds of disaffection and weakening HUD's initial hopes for strong mayoral involvement in and support for the program.[3] Many mayors refused to participate actively because they felt it was an invitation to political suicide to have to choose one area of the city over another—even having to favor one poor area over another poor area.

[3] "Model Cities in Perspective," Fred Jordan, *Model Cities—A Report on Progress*, Special Issue, National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors, June 1971, p. 4.

When in 1971 Planned Variations gave 20 cities an opportunity to develop a citywide strategy of urban development and to double Model Cities funds, the chief executives reacted favorably. This has enabled these mayors to treat almost all disadvantaged areas, to reach the community at-large with some programs, and to gain necessary support for bond issues and tax increases and other community development objectives.[4]

The Planned Variations cities in this study—Seattle, Dayton, Indianapolis and Newark—have all experienced favorable citizen acceptance for dealing with problems on a citywide basis and in a more realistic way. Moreover, the majority of funds are still being invested in the disadvantaged areas, but this is the case mainly because the Model Cities mandate for dealing with the poor is still in effect. An emphasis away from the poverty areas could very well take place under special revenue sharing or some form of block grants. In the Planned Variations cities, for example, there is already a shift away from programs which deal primarily with the disadvantaged and a change to physically oriented projects as opposed to human resource programs. In order to maintain a concentration of effort on the poor, any new legislation should stipulate that a certain percentage of funds would have to be used in disadvantaged areas.

Comprehensive Planning.—By concentrating efforts, there has been at least some visibility of projects in the target areas. Furthermore, it allowed some money to be spread in almost every major functional area to fulfill the requirements of comprehensive treatment. However, it turned out that not enough money could be allocated across-the-board to carry out the goals established by residents and planners or to reach the threshold in individual functions where a noticeable and permanent difference could be made.

Although an excellent planning tool, comprehensiveness caused too great a diffusion of resources. As it happened, citizen committees were set up in major functional areas (usually ten or 12) and each had to have "their" share of the pie, even though a particular function might have had lower priority than other functions. To illustrate, in one case a $3 million Model Cities grant was split into 12 parts of about $200,000 each, and six or ten projects under each function. There was not enough money in any area to make a meaningful impact, but it satisfied citizen groups by giving them all something. The number of projects in most cities proliferated irrationally, which meant that instead of having 20 or 30 projects, cities turned up with over 50 (as in Dayton and Newark) and in some cases over 100 (in New York City 300). In a positive sense, comprehensiveness was serving its purpose as a planning tool; in a negative way, there was little impact on a visible product in the Model Neighborhoods. Lessons have been learned, however, and in the past two years, many cities have cut their projects in half and concentrated funds in high priority areas.

The whole Model Cities planning process was likely the most extensive ever in the analysis of urban problems in a manner which has required action and solutions at the end. It meant analyzing root causes and the reasons why they originated. However, local interpreta-

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[4] Much earlier in 1968, Boston's Mayor Kevin White launched a municipally funded citywide little city hall program for much the same reason but particularly to improve communication and reduce alienation throughout the city. See *Municipal Decentralization and Neighborhood Resources*, George J. Washnis, Praeger, 1973. p. 72.

tion of the planning process was perhaps as confusing as its understanding of the citizen participation process. Some officials envisioned it as traditional land-use planning, which usually produces loads of material to sit on shelves. But unfortunately, much of the local distrust for planners and plans was dispelled because community people were eventually included in the process and because there was money to deal with problems after analysis. The physical planners began to consider social concepts in greater depth and to integrate human and physical amenities into a single plan. In some cases, social planning divisions were added to once sterile, physically oriented departments. And HUD made a point of emphasizing the importance of the interrelationships of problems and causes and the past failures of trying to deal with one problem (urban renewal, welfare, housing) solutions. It was soon obvious that the planning process was highly complex and that a comprehensive plan was not achievable in one year. Its work would have to be spread out over several years of planning.

The planning process has had mixed effects. The results of the first year of planning were judged a modest success by Marshall Kaplan, Gans and Kahn Associates, who were assigned the responsibility of studying the Model Cities Program almost from its inception to the present. At the same time, they enumerated the problems which held up planning: (1) immediate escalation of citizen participation which diverted attention away from planning (2) comprehensiveness was less the result of an organized process and more a post-facto rationalization on paper (a kind of stitching together), (3) the pressure of deadlines kept everybody straining at project development and provided little time for studying and perfecting the process, and (4) HUD was unable to understand that innovative process does not necessarily bring about innovative product.[5]

In its concluding studies of the Model Cities program, Kaplan Associates was still not convinced that the concept of comprehensive planning was achieved. Most cities still have several planning systems in operation and traditional planning departments are still too physically oriented. To help correct this, they believe that the details of comprehensive planning should not be dictated by federal agencies; rather, federal assistance should be in the form of money or staff for localities to develop their own systems and capability. They express particular disenchantment that the use of private consultants, who were hired to do a large part of the local planning, has not increased the capacity of local government to perform on its own. They advocate the continuation of comprehensive planning through an improved local management system and a stronger role for the chief executive and his staff.[6]

Experience of Cities. Our study of eight cities concludes that progress has been made in comprehensive planning. Cities like Dayton and Seattle have come a long way in five years, progress which would unlikely have taken place without the Model Cities and Planned Variations programs. Even Newark, in spite of its unusual problems, has made significant strides in bringing all planning elements together

[5] *The Model Cities Program: A History and Analysis of the Planning Process in Three Cities*, Marshall Kaplan, Gans and Kahn Associates, 1969, pp. 90–92

[6] *The Model Cities Program: A Comparative Analysis of City Response Patterns and Their Relation to Future Urban Policy*, Marshall Kaplan, Gans and Kahn Associates, Spring 1973.

and developing an overall city policy in human and physical development. Chicago has developed a citywide social planning division, has combined the resources and planning capacities of the Model Cities and Community Action Programs, and for the first time has given serious consideration to the integration of human and physical planning in most city programs. Comprehensive planning has been extremely difficult to achieve under New York's complex governmental structure and is only in its initial stages in Savannah and Boston (with the possible exception of the Dorchester area in Boston).

Indianapolis has proceeded the furthest because of its own aggressiveness and also because federal agencies have given it invaluable assistance. The city is attempting to consolidate all its planning functions and to treat problems comprehensively through a Unified Planning System under the Department of Community Services. An important element is the integrated information flow (Unified Management Information System), which passes data from its origins of federal, state, city and neighborhood units through systems of collection, processing, retrieval, analysis, decision-making, display and dissemination. The management system includes the consolidation of all funding, and the research and evaluation of all functions and programs. A team of Community Services Program professionals with multidisciplinary backgrounds (planning, economic, sociology, and political science) performs most of the evaluation. Potential trouble spots are treated quickly. And the basic planning staff deals across the board with all disciplines—human and physical—and also receives input from a structure of neighborhood councils. Even at the present time, only one common work program is necessary to meet the requirements of each federal agency and only one contract is prepared for each agency. The city hopes that eventually it will be necessary to prepare only one city document for all programs, much as it would be under special revenue sharing or block grants. Already Washington requires only one annual audit for Indianapolis.

Other cities have benefited from the general reduction of red tape. Shortly after assuming office, Floyd Hyde substantially reduced requirements for paperwork by permitting cities to submit simplified statements on strategy and objectives, on the planning process, and neighborhood conditions and other regulations. He also ordered his own staff to cut HUD directives by more than half, or he would simply throw out every other page. These changes clearly show up in the Planned Variations Program where the size of applications has been reduced as much as 75 percent, living proof that the executive branch can make programs eminently more simple for localities and still demand that Congressional mandates be carried out. Of course, block grants would simplify the process further.

Coordination

Improving coordination has been one of Model Cities' most difficult objectives but at least the first steps have been taken. It has been particularly arduous to do much about coordinating government units while working from one small target area. To achieve success in the coordination of programs and agencies it appears a citywide approach and strong chief executive involvement are prime requisites. Planned Variations has taken the next few steps by moving in this direction.

Model Cities experienced a number of difficulties in its attempts to integrate programs and reduce duplications. Agencies and special government units had no intention of giving up power and, in most cases, chief executives were too far removed to be able to influence groups outside of local government. In James Sundquist's *Making Federalism Work*, he points out that mayors have been expected to undo 50 years of work of the good government groups which succeeded in isolating large segments of government from the influence of chief executives and the "evils" of partisan politics.[1] Normally, cities have been only one of a dozen or more independent government units in the same geographic area, with little responsibility over education, manpower health, transit, urban renewal and housing. And in many governments, the mayor finds himself in a weak position under a complex system of boards and commissions. Model Cities tried to by-pass many of these traditional problems by dealing directly with the agencies.

Techniques Used to Improve Coordination.—The program's most powerful resource has been the ability to "buy into" other agencies in order to gain some degree of cooperation. Even the powerful Richard Daley in Chicago admitted he was unable to move certain agencies in the direction of meeting city objectives until he was able to offer them supplemental Model Cities funds. Almost all the cities have used the "buy in" technique. They also established intergovernmental task forces and hired special staff. Through the catalyst of HUD money, the states were encouraged to cooperate more than usual by employing state personnel for coordinating purposes and setting up Model Cities offices to assist local governments.

A–95 Process.—The Model Cities Program demonstrated a need to formalize and strengthen coordinating procedures. One such device was the A–95 Project Notification and Review System, which was devised by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in 1969. For those programs under A–95, federal agencies require applicants to submit brief descriptions of their projects to state and areawide clearinghouses, which in turn are required to clear appropriate projects with cities and counties. Local governments can make their own review and request the clearinghouse to pass the comments on to the federal agencies.

Although the process has helped, it has been less than successful. Some of the difficulties have been (1) inadequate review staff, (2) too little "clout," (3) too few federal and state agencies ready to participate, and, (4) time limitations which have made the process rather mechanical. Clearinghouses have been so understaffed that they have been little more than large "stapling machines" and their boards of directors (mostly elected officials from the region) have been too busy with other matters.

On the other hand, local chief executives have been more effective. For example, Mayor Richard Lugar of Indianapolis has used Planned Variations money to increase staff capacity and to improve his review system. He has also devised a questionnaire which other agencies are obligated to use to secure city approval for projects. This review system, like any other, functions only as well as the abilities of the people administering it. Indianapolis has had both the will and the resources to develop a satisfactory system.

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[1] *Making Federalism Work*, James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, Brookings Institution, 1969.

Chief Executive Review and Comment.—To improve upon the A–95 process, the Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC) strategy was introduced by OMB in 1972 for the Planned Variations program. CERC extends the philosophy of the A–95 process by strengthening the role of the chief executive, giving him adequate staff and authority, and adding policy development to the office. Mayor Kenneth Gibson in Newark, for example, has created a Mayor's Office of Policy and Review and has placed CERC under its director. Indianapolis has located CERC under a deputy mayor in charge of the Community Services Department. CERC has not only given chief executives courage to deal with outside agencies, it has also given them the resources to be able to make some meaningful changes.

Annual Arrangements.—Another system designed to facilitate coordination is HUD's Annual Arrangements. It is simply a negotiation process between federal regional officials and local officials to establish realistic city priorities, based on the actual amount of federal funds available during the year. The process takes about as long as negotiations for grants have always taken but the important thing is that it is designed to save time and frustrations over the long-run. Cities avoid going through the tedious process of applying for funds which are not there, and communication between the different levels of government is considerably improved.

In any event, it is fair to attribute the development of these new management techniques largely to the experiences realized under Model Cities.

Demonstration and Innovation

Two additional purposes of Model Cities have been demonstration and innovation. These are usually closely linked, since almost any demonstration is either a new idea (innovation) or funding for an old idea in a new city. Usually, however, when programs are simply expanded to increase existing services, they are more demonstrations of impact than anything else.

On the whole, Model Cities has not been the catalyst for a great many untried projects. However, it has made it possible to demonstrate how existing concepts can be applied and what effect they will have in ghetto areas. Making certain projects available in disadvantaged areas has been an innovation in itself. And by implementing programs areawide, some new results have taken place that were not achieved when applied to a smaller population group, including such things as more effective community organization, the necessity for agencies to cooperate and avoid duplication, and the serious analysis of community problems.

Innovations have been of large and small varieties. Model schools—composed of adult evening classes, intensive remedial courses for slow learners, parents in the classrooms, and citizens advisory councils—were introduced for the first time in Boston, Seattle, and Chicago, for example. Semi-independent satellite corporations—which operate manpower, health, housing, and social services in competition with established agencies—were created in Dayton. And the introduction of ideas such as boy scouts, ballet, camp, day care, and neighborhood health centers to ghetto children have all been novel. Coordinating task forces, unprecedented state involvement in model neighborhoods, and the combination of social and physical planning are new concepts

to many sections of the country. Indeed, having the poor sit on policy-making boards with elected officials is an innovation.

Yet there has been a paucity of ideas from all quarters, including the professionals and consultants—many of whom contributed to the plans. Not many new ways have been found to do things, but at least there is a greater understanding that once ideas are formulated and community concurrence achieved, it takes skilled help to operate programs successfully. In many quarters that too is novel.

Institutional Change

Some innovations have led to institutional changes. But altering the basic ways agencies and governments operate is not easy. As we have already indicated, stone walls exist between most agencies and change agents who wish to improve coordination, acquire additional resources, better services, or make agencies more responsive to local general government and/or residents. What tends to happen is that once agencies get established in that with comfortable civil service positions and salaries and stable operating clients. At least this is what the Model Cities Program—with the help of inquisitive residents—found to be true in most cases.

The likelihood of turning around this seemingly normal bureaucratic tendency is greater under a system of external (impartial) evaluation, determined citizen groups, and a chief executive who is interested. Some of the "new breed" mayors (a majority of those in this study) have been that as determined to change the way public agencies and city departments operate as citizens have, and they have succeeded in many instances. It is this combination which will most likely continue to succeed. Strengthening the chief executive as the main actor (through CERC, Annual Arrangements, etc.) might give him sufficient responsibility whereby he will have to produce. It appears that only with the in-depth involvement at local general government will cities experience rapid and significant institutional change. So far the more independent Model Cities programs have not been highly successful in this respect, there are examples of change.

Health Centers.—Model Cities acted as the catalyst for the development of neighborhood health centers in seven cities in this study (and for a large percentage of the 147 cities in the nationwide proposal). Clinics providing these services to entire geographic areas of the poor have changed the traditional ways health departments operate, and it appears the new system is most likely to remain, particularly in light of the fact that this country's child health dilemma is its inability to deliver quality health service (preventive and emergency) to the neighborhood level.

For example, Boston not only changed the way traditional health institutions operate, it has been the catalyst for incorporating the latest health care philosophy of treating all family problems at one source. And Newark Model Cities can take credit for inadvertently changing a backward city health department to one actively engaged in treating a broad range of health care problems.

Model Schools.—Model schools have credited institutional changes to at least three cities in this study. The improvement has been successful in Chicago. For example, we would like to extend the demonstration in the nine model neighborhood schools to the entire system.

Manpower Centers.—Improving manpower programs has largely been the task of the Labor Department, but Model Cities has used much of its own funds to make additional headway in the target areas. Funding manpower centers—as has occurred in Seattle—for purposes of agency coordination, client convenience, and comprehensive treatment of individual problems (health, grooming, counseling, education and testing and interviewing techniques)—has been a major change in the usual way of doing business. Getting state employment service personnel out of their offices into the neighborhoods and streets to search for the unemployed has certainly changed the outlook of these once rather staid agencies. Although the Community Action agencies were first to make changes in the manpower field, Model Cities agencies instituted similar practices in their own neighborhoods.

Semi-Independent Corporations.—A number of cities have established nonprofit corporations incorporated by the state. Some of the more effective semi-independent corporations will most likely continue; others will probably be eliminated in favor of operation by established agencies.

The chief criticism is that they are competing units which have not materially changed the way established agencies operate. Much of this is due to the fact that they are too far removed from the internal operations of the system. It is still too early to tell whether agencies will adopt Dayton's satellite corporations. On the other hand, corporations in certain other cities have included agency people in their operations, encouraging them to make changes. Multiservice centers in Chicago and Savannah (Norfolk; Kansas City, Mo.; and many other cities), for example, have been particularly adept at getting the agencies into target areas, handling clients differently, and forcing some permanent changes.

One of the purposes of the Model Cities Program was to test new delivery systems and to encourage the continuation of effective operations and the elimination of others. Hopefully, one of the lessons we have learned is not to abandon all programs, but to pick from the good and bad. We must also hope that block grants will not discourage the use of federal money for experimentation.

Management Capacity

Increasing Responsibility and Capacity.—The Model Cities Program has served as a measuring tool for management needs and it has demonstrated the wisdom for local officials to deal with a wide variety of human and physical functions. In many cases, it has exposed the lack of management capacity in local general government and made obvious the need for additional professional staff. The program's planning objectives made it necessary for mayors to deal with problems not traditionally in their scope of concern, such as education, health, economic development, welfare and jobs. In order to deal effectively with these mostly human services, it has been necessary to recruit from professions with which chief executives have not been entirely familiar. But recruiting, communicating, and developing policy with these new management types has had the effect of illuminating city officials about the problems of other agencies and how the latter influence the course of city development. Chief executives have come a long way in understanding the need for coordination, comprehensive planning, review and evaluation of public agency proposals, and above all the

necessity to have competent staff of their own in all functional areas. In this manner, other professionals and politicians might be willing to follow local government's lead.

However, it has been difficult to use a great deal of these funds to improve the chief executive's capacity. Too much of Model Cities money has been consumed by sources such as City Demonstration Agency (CDA) staffs and their need to respond to excessive federal requirements; the training of subprofessionals; and a pure lack of sound organization in many cases. Administrative expenses have run as high as 20 percent (as was the case in New York City). Most local officials believe that costs for training are justified and will be rewarding in the long run, but they clearly feel other expenses can be drastically reduced. This is one of the objectives of special revenue sharing, to cut red tape and administrative expenses by starting fresh or at least to shift qualified personnel from the more independent CDA's to the chief executive's staff.

Streamlining the organization of Model Cities into a more directly responsible city department, such as Community Services in Indianapolis and Urban Affairs in Kansas City, Mo., is a natural step to improving government as long as basic objectives of the program are maintained, including innovation, coordination, comprehensiveness, and citizen involvement. Furthermore, much confusion and duplication can be eliminated through the consolidation of Community Action, Model Cities, and other overlapping bureaucracies into single city urban affairs departments (as has been done in Chicago). It must be made clear, however, that the above objectives of Model Cities need be retained and that independent citizen groups should actually be strengthened, partly with government funds. At least several of the cities in this study are proceeding to do this, realizing that proper local organization and the retention of the most competent staff from social programs should make an immediate and marked improvement on local government capacity.

In addition to reorganization, almost all local general governments now realize the need for additional staff capacity. But in regards to hiring additional staff, local government officials are very realistic in their appraisal of the lack of will of city councils to approve general tax money (including community development and other broad federal funds) for increased professional staff. Because of taxpayer criticism, funds for this purpose will most likely have to come from a special federal source. Indianapolis, for example, is using over $1 million of its Planned Variations funds for this very purpose, to hire whatever number and quality of staff are necessary to get the total management job done. It is doubtful that they would have used substantial local tax funds for this purpose.

In fact, the fastest way to improve local government may be the use of a special fund to hire and train the best possible administrators in the nation to help solve our urban problems, much as was done to drain off the best minds to meet the nation's aerospace objectives. Comprehensive Planning and Management Act (once known as "Section 701 grants") funds might be increased to $400 million annually so that all communities and the nation could realize its benefits immediately. Instead, it looks as if Congress may go in the other direction, cutting funds from $100 million to $75 million. On the other

hand, the Administration's Responsive Government Act may pick up some new money for purposes of improving management, but the commitment of resources is not anywhere near the same level this nation has made to other high priority goals.

Change of Emphasis.—Too many people expected too much from the Model Cities experiment. Indeed, we overestimated the will and competence of cities and counties to meet the urban crisis. Local administrators were undertrained or not available and HUD was just as ill-prepared to meet Model Cities objectives. The process was as new to federal people as it was to local technicians. At this stage, a lot of the problems have been worked out and there are more competent professionals to deal with. But now local project directors worry about the shift in emphasis, believing that there is too much stress on better government and too little on the goals of quality of life. Nevertheless, HUD officials believe that improved management will help local government reach these goals. Floyd Hyde believes that they are complementary. In his words, "We are on the right track on how to make this government system work." [5]

Citizen Participation

General.—Perhaps the most controversial requirement in the Model Cities Program has been citizen participation. The intent of its designers was to tone down participation from the highs of the Community Action Program to something closer to the urban renewal experiences, yet not go as far as to "plan for" people but rather to "plan with them." To the surprise of many, citizen participation developed so strongly in many cities that the original conception of the mayor's role—as one of unquestioned control—was far more uncertain than the role for citizens. The resident's role developed so strongly in a few cases that established government was actually threatened and programs were delayed.

Under the Nixon Administration's New Federalism, roles were redefined. A stronger role was stressed for the chief executive, and later an even stronger one conceived under the proposed Better Communities Act. In a number of the citywide Planned Variations experiments, roles of the citizens declined to an advisory position; while in others, they have remained at about the same strength. In the eight cities in this study, most of the original resident councils have remained at the same level of power. But there seems to be little question in the minds of residents and elected officials that citizen power will be considerably diluted without a legislative mandate to sustain it.

An increasing number of local officials see the value in citizen involvement and some express incredulity that we still need a federal mandate to ensure that it continues. On the other hand, there have been good and bad experiences. In some cases, cities have had little problems; in others, a hard core of self-interested resident spokesmen have delayed progress. On the whole, the experience has been worthwhile as cities have ironed out the kinks.

Lessons.—There are a number of lessons to be learned from the various citizen participation processes. First, we should not accept the experience of any one city as typical. Too often the chief executive is

[5] Planned Variations Seminar, Indianapolis, Sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors, August 2, 1973.

willing to use his single experience to draw judgment about a whole complex process. There is too great a variety of conditions, social and physical, which may influence success or the lack of it. These include the degree of mayor leadership, skills of the chief administrative officer, competency of Model Cities staff, leadership and cooperative nature of the citizen board chairman, factional conflicts on the board, self-interests of a few, lack of balanced interests on the board, little authority or purpose for the board, poor facilities and inadequate citizen staff, and the immensity of problems and shortage of resources.

Yet in spite of difficulties, effective leadership from both the mayor and board can overcome most problems. In essence, the success of the citizen process—quite aside from its formal structure—depends largely on the leadership ability of city officials and how much time they are willing to devote to it. In the end, it may involve disbanding the original structure or structures and starting anew until the right mix of ingredients is found. In almost all cases, the correct mixture can be found.

But why even begin a process with potential conflict? Many observers admit that there has not been a great deal of progress with or without citizen participation. But there are purposes for citizen participation especially learned through the Model Cities process: (1) to develop an education and training process so that the average and poor American can become honestly involved in the understanding and operation of local government and in making decisions which might affect his life, (2) to improve communication and trust between city hall and residents, (3) to develop new leaders from a class of people who otherwise might never have such an opportunity, (4) to get early agreement on the kinds of projects citizens want so that progress would not later be held up, (5) to provide citizens with an effective process by which they can effectively criticize and evaluate services, and (6) to formalize participation structures so that they may become a genuine part of government.

Model Cities Product

Process vs. Product.—In the Model Cities Program, it is more difficult to distinguish between product and process because one of Model Cities' products has been to improve government processes. Some observers point out that there has been considerable success in process but not in product. Yet a large part of what we have described so far is as much product as process.

Such things as innovation, institutional change, improved management, and more effective citizen involvement are products of the Model Cities process and are in themselves a higher quality of government and life. Product and process are very much interrelated.

Measurement of Product.—Product can be measured in a number of ways. We have looked at it in three ways: level of service, efficiency, and quality of service. In all of the Model Neighborhoods in this study, quality of service has naturally improved for those thousands of citizens who have never received such services in the past. In most of the neighborhoods, the quality of service has been improved for all citizens through addition of staff and equipment and improved techniques. For many projects, efficiency is equal or better than agencies providing similar services; for other projects, efficiency, productivity, and the best use of the tax dollar are far below standard.

This study did not include an evaluation of all projects in the eight cities and was not meant to. Conclusions are based on a review of the principal projects in each city, direct observation and interviews with staff and clients. We believe that most of the cities have reached a point where major projects are providing at least standard services as stipulated in individual contracts, but that considerable improvement can be made with more highly trained staff, better facilities, more resources (in some cases), and more effective evaluations.

Importantly, although individual projects may perform satisfactory, it is difficult to see any measurable improvement in the overall quality of life for entire model neighborhoods. For the most part, housing and streets are still in a deteriorated state, unemployment is high, and survey after survey shows citizen discontent with their lot and a remarkable lack of understanding about the objectives of Model Cities. The elimination of outdoor toilets, paving of a few streets, and the construction of some scattered homes have not been enough to raise the spirits of the mass of people. Yet, in spite of this, there are improvements in some quality of life goals.

Level of Service.—A simple declaration of the level of service is not indicative of costs or quality, but it does demonstrate new efforts in poor neighborhoods. It is an indicator of how many people are being served at a particular period of time, almost all of whom were never receiving such services before. A later section entitled Assessment of Product describes the types of services in more detail and gives figures of service levels where available. In many instances in this study, programs were only in their beginning stages and sometimes data was not kept in the cities. However, as projects finish their fourth and fifth years, such data should be more readily available and also more valuable for comparative purposes.

Efficiency.—The level of increase in services in proportion to costs is one measure of efficiency. In this study we have primarily used this method to judge increases in productivity. We have not made comparisons of basic costs with other public or private enterprises. However, it was determined that in some cases costs were higher and in others lower than other agencies. Our concern was whether productivity was improving or not. Of course, conditions vary from city-to-city and also with the kind of service. A health care program in one city can serve as an example.

The three Model Cities health centers in Boston served only 18,000 clients in 1971. This increased to 68,000 in 1972 and has continually increased during 1973 with the same number of centers and approximately same basic costs exclusive of supplies. This increase has been indicative of several factors: (1) greater resident trust in the system, (2) improved communications (including the use of several media) with residents, and (3) the fact that many citizens have accustomed themselves to using the centers with the same regularity that higher income groups visit their family doctors or local hospitals. Although use of the centers is lower than officials would like in relationship to the outlay of funds, it is increasing at a fairly rapid rate. As a consequence, productivity and efficiency are up because of a substantial increase in workload and the maintenance of quality and costs. Furthermore, since these services are available to all model neighborhood residents whenever they need them, community health care—as one meas-

ure of quality of life factors—is higher in general. It could be improved further by using the highest quality physicians and by increasing chief executive interest. The point is that this project (and others like it) ought to be preserved and strengthened, for it has demonstrated a sound base for improving quality and lowering per capita costs.

Quality of Service.—Quality (or effectiveness) of services is more difficult to measure. In Boston's health centers, inasmuch as more people are getting approved health care from licensed medical personnel than ever before, quality of care is better—and so is the delivery system. Usually the strongest complaints against neighborhood operations are leveled at the inexperience or inabilities of the director and or staff. Facilities, location and equipment have been generally adequate, or are such that they can be corrected in a very direct way. On the other hand, personnel actions take more time because of human sensitivities, politics, or the unwillingness of boards to act. Furthermore, it is especially difficult to find competent persons who want to work in poor areas at lower salaries and less favorable conditions than private practice offers elsewhere. In spite of these pitfalls, the personnel in Boston's centers are rated highly satisfactory by their fellow medical workers in private practice and by residents of the model neighborhood. And as the quality of care is recognized by more citizens, attendance should increase further.

Concluding Comment.—The Model Cities Program has only taken the first few steps toward quality of life goals but at least it has moved us a little closer to an understanding of the problems of the poor and has taught us a great deal more about what is needed to solve some of the most serious problems. The program has gone through what it had to go through first, showing residents and city officials alike all the elements of a rationale planning process. Citizens had to learn almost from scratch about government processes, the inventories of plans and policies, and how to get local officials to think about priorities most important to residents. And government officials learned more about the importance of the all encompassing management needed to deal with the new priorities. So far both citizens and officials have benefited, and the quality of life for a large number of disadvantaged citizens has improved as well.

III. Characteristics of Model Neighborhoods

Size and Severity

The characteristics of neighborhoods served by the Model Cities Program can be illustrated by the eight cities where we conducted case studies: Seattle, Chicago, Indianapolis, Dayton, Savannah, Newark, New York, and Boston. In all cases, the cities selected target areas because of the extreme of their deterioration and depression. But the cities vary in the degree of blight, from most severe in New York, Newark and Chicago to lesser degrees of oppressiveness in the other cities. In fact in Seattle's case, observers have asked "where are the slums?" Yet hidden behind a facade of fairly sound structures are depressed human souls.

Most of the smaller cities have pockets of blight, such as in Savannah, but these pockets are physically as bad as the larger areas in the big cities. But for the most part, the human problems in the smaller cities are somewhat less severe than those in the larger cities because problems of crime, drugs, youth gangs, congestion and the like are not as intense. In most cases, knowingly or unknowingly, citizens of smaller cities are already better off than their counterparts in big cities.

The Model Cities Program has been able to make a greater impact in smaller communities because the level of funding has been more commensurate with the problems. Therefore, proportionately more people have been served and results have been more visible. We believe it would not take an excessive national commitment of resources to wipe away the problems of slums in cities under 200,000 population. The larger cities and counties would need special programs.

The seriousness of the problem in the model neighborhoods is still not recognized by some. Whether it be a large or small community, the problems each family faces—discrimination, inadequate education, and lack of opportunity—are as important as any set of problems anywhere else. The statistics of blight in all the model neighborhoods points out the severity of individual problems. Although Model Cities, in conjunction with other programs, has improved the physical and social environments some percentage points, conditions still remain severe. Model Cities has taken only the first few steps.

Health Crisis

In all the cities, health care facilities were inadequate and doctors have been leaving the inner city in vast numbers. The development of neighborhood health centers has improved conditions immeasurably, and some doctors have been encouraged to come back to the ghettos. But health indices are appalling. Newark's death rate, for example, is 35 percent above the national average. In New York's model neighborhoods infant mortality is more than twice that of the rest of the city, drug addiction is five times greater, and alcoholism four times as much. Savannah too has problems—infant mortality rate in the

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model neighborhood is one-third higher than the county as a whole, the tuberculosis rate more than twice the county rate, and infectious syphilis four times the county figure. None of the model neighborhoods in the eight cities were found immune from these glaring deficiencies.

Overcrowding

Of course, overcrowding is not only a major health factor but results in poor conditions in general. In Newark, 85 percent of the housing units in the model area were built prior to 1940 and 74.3 percent are deficient. Remarkedly, although 10,000 housing units were demolished in the city between June 1969 and June 1972, no single-family units or public housing was built during this period, and only 14 two-family and 682 multi-family units were constructed. In New York's model areas, only about 20 percent of the housing is sound, compared to 64 percent citywide. In Savannah, more than 60 percent of the model neighborhood housing was constructed prior to 1930 and only four percent of it is considered standard; outside toilets flourish, and so far, there are no public or federally subsidized housing in the model area. In contrast, substandard housing in Seattle's model neighborhoods is considerably higher when compared to the city as a whole.

Educational Achievement

Education too has been sorely inadequate. Ten of Newark's 14 permanent model neighborhood elementary schools were constructed before 1901, and generally operate at 112 percent of capacity, with some having 51 percent more pupils than originally planned. During this review, ten of Savannah's 11 model neighborhood schools were reported to have mental maturity, reading and arithmetic norms one and two grades below the national average. In Seattle's model neighborhood, one half of household heads did not finish high school, while in Savannah, 53 percent of adults over 25 years of age had less than an eighth grade education. And in almost every one of the model neighborhoods, most students do not go beyond high school, and drop out rates are as much as twice as high as for the rest of the school system.

Unemployment

Unemployment and welfare are well out of proportion in all of the model neighborhoods. In 1972, Newark registered 17 percent unemployment and 36,000 persons on some form of public assistance. At the same time in the New York model neighborhoods, unemployment was twice the national average, twice as many residents had unskilled jobs, and three times as many were on welfare compared to the city as a whole. Seattle has been experiencing a severe grip of unemployment primarily because of aerospace industry cutbacks. It has ranged from 13 to 18 percent during 1972 in the city as a whole and as high as 28 percent in the model neighborhood. It is typical for the model neighborhoods to have unemployment rates two or three times the city's average as well as unusually high percentage of the city's welfare case loads. When youth and females and those who have temporarily given up looking for work are included, unemployment figures in most model neighborhoods reach as high as 30 percent. If one adds the underemployed, these figures rise to 50 percent in some areas—certainly a tragic condition.

Other Factors

Other services are rated just as poorly. Crime figures in the model neighborhoods are considerably higher than for the cities as a whole, sometimes as much as double. Youth gangs are prevalent in the larger cities and law enforcement less effective. Recreation facilities and supervision are grossly inadequate, multi-service centers almost nonexistent, transportation ineffective in carrying residents to jobs and service centers, day care facilities inadequate, and many city services poorly delivered. Housing code enforcement, street construction and repair, refuse collection, and recreation and park space have been the prime areas of complaint. Encouragingly, the Model Cities programs have begun to make progress in some of these areas.

One of the key factors in the creation of slums is discrimination. This means a wide range of discrimination encompassing such things as services, schools, housing, jobs, social contacts, and political acceptance. The demography of the model neighborhoods clearly shows segregated patterns. Most of the neighborhoods are majority black. One of the four Chicago areas is predominantly white, and one of the three New York areas is about 60 percent Puerto Rican, while another New York area has a large Puerto Rican and Italian population (see Table III below, Demography of Model Neighborhoods). There are concentrations of ethnic groups in most of the model neighborhoods; however, they are small in comparison to the total populations.

Some citizens have described Model Cities as a program for blacks. Block grants or some scheme of citywide orientation could very well erase this connotation. But of course, the discouraging statistics of the model neighborhoods shows that the nation still needs to concentrate resources in these severely depressed zones. And even with possible errors in statistics—10 percent unemployment rather than 12 percent, or 50 percent more crime rather than double—there appears to be a clear mandate that special efforts need to be taken in the model neighborhoods and other areas like them.

TABLE III.—DEMOGRAPHY OF MODEL NEIGHBORHOODS

City	Population	Model neighborhood population	Model neighborhood demography
Newark	384,000	75,087	Blacks 77 percent, Spanish-speaking 15 percent, and Italian and other 8 percent.
Indianapolis	792,299	50,000	Black 75 percent.
Savannah	118,000	21,520	Black 70 percent.
Seattle	530,831	38,581	Black 58 percent.
Dayton	243,601	35,000	Black 98 percent.
Boston	641,071	57,003	Black 67.8 percent, white 19.3 percent, Spanish 11.3 percent, and Indian and Asian 1.6 percent.
New York	7,894,862	1,000,000	
(a) South Bronx		260,000	Black 32 percent, Puerto Rican 61 percent, and white 7 percent.
(b) Central Harlem East Harlem		240,000	Black 39 percent, Puerto Rican 60 percent and Italian and other 20 percent.
(c) Central Brooklyn		500,000	Black 60 percent, Puerto Rican 30 percent, and Italian and other 10 percent.
Chicago	3,563,400	326,823	
(a) Woodlawn		60,030	Black 99 percent.
(b) Near South		115,877	Do.
(c) Lawndale		96,916	Do.
(d) Uptown		54,000	Appalachian whites 29 percent, Indians, blacks, orientals 29 percent, and Puerto Rican and other 42 percent.

IV. Assessment of the Product

Improving the quality of life and achieving concrete program results have been fundamental to the Model Cities Program. Yet little has been done to assess the product of these goals, for almost all evaluations have concentrated on process. In fact, there is no overall federal compilation showing in which detailed categories the money was spent (such as street lighting, street repairs, etc.) let alone the effectiveness of expenditures. In most cases, when federal officials describe the lack of results in product, they have little substance to back up their allegations. On the other hand, many localities have conducted specific program evaluations which are very useful in providing an estimate of progress.

This study's direct assessment of eight cities—plus the utilization of local evaluation reports—has resulted in conclusions which we feel offer a useful picture of the program's progress. However, because of the extensive number of projects, only major ones were reviewed, and only through part of the fourth action year. Meanwhile, with the apparent phasing out of Model Cities, it seems there should be more concern about the product, what chance there still is for success, and what needs to be done to make improvements. Such analysis should take place regardless of the way the federal government plans to funnel money to local government.

This review has found that not only in these eight cities but every other city we have looked at, product success has depended primarily on the caliber of each project's staff, as long as adequate resources were present. Chief executive leadership, citizen interest, and other factors—although important—have always been secondary. A competent staff usually proceeds straight away and does its job, many times regardless of the political and social climate. Of course, better leadership from the top, efficient procedures, and citizen support make the job easier.

In the following pages, an assessment is made of major functional areas—health, education, manpower and economic development, housing, social services, and law and justice—and results cities have had in dealing with many of the projects within these broad categories. There are many successes as well as plenty of failures; but even with limited successes, there are notable changes in the quality of life. Several conclusions are drawn: (1) each project should be judged on its individual merits and not totally disparaged because the rest of the function did not succeed. (2) It is illogical and wasteful to throw out whole programs simply to try new ideas. Good programs should be saved. (3) We should benefit from past mistakes by making improvements in those projects which have a reasonable chance of succeeding. Many times it is only one or two needed elements that will make the difference.

Seattle's Success

When looking at whole programs in the eight cities, Seattle's is the most impressive. This is due to competent staffing, good relations between city hall and residents, and executive leadership. Little energy has been expended fighting over roles, and there have been few delays or serious conflicts. Priorities were readily agreed upon, the projects were implemented expeditiously, and both internal and external mechanisms were created to monitor and correct programs from the very first year. Meanwhile many other cities let their evaluation components start up late on the theory that there was not anything to evaluate so early in the program. The administrators in these cities discounted the importance of early evaluation of such things as ideas, plans, facilities and staff. Too many of their monitors were obsessed with numbers, waiting for client lists to grow and failing to analyze personnel and policies.

On the other hand, Seattle learned its lesson well. It was not content with its own impressions of programs; it hired impartial consultants with special expertise in each function to make evaluations. With few exceptions, other cities did not wish to do this for fear negative reports might hurt their funding, and besides they were not used to evaluating regular city programs in this fashion—at least not across the board. But this evaluation paid off for Seattle because recommendations were followed in most instances.[1]

But even with its major components working well, Seattle's success has not been overwhelming. Resources have been short, unemployment high, experience in the human resource field minimal, and in plain words, it has been simply too much to expect economic and social conditions to change in a few short years. But let us look at the principal functions in all the cities.

Health Projects

Seattle.—In health programs, Seattle Model Cities has made substantial headway in pre-paid health insurance, representative community health councils, and general health planning. Although pre-paid health for 1,350 low-income families is comparable to standard health insurance, highly desirable services of transportation and child care have been added. The Community Health Board, Inc.—composed of five model neighborhood residents, five professionals, and five mayoral appointees—advises on all local health matters and is developing a comprehensive health care system. This board is an institutional change, as are several other things: (1) the system of neighborhood health centers (plus a successful mobile dental component), (2) community-based mental health center (over 6,000 monthly visits), and (3) an alcoholic rehabilitation center. Under Planned Variations, these projects have been expanded to three other disadvantaged areas in the city, and King County, which takes in the suburbs, has been sufficiently impressed to emulate parts of Seattle's Model Cities health program.

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[1] Seattle and other cities have improved upon their evaluation technique. Some cities would like to extend this experience of in-depth evaluation to other city departments as a regular procedure of local government—in contrast to the more superficial annual budget review process. One or two percent of the city budgets spent for this purpose could do much to improve the caliber of local government.

Indianapolis and Boston.—Neighborhood health centers have been particularly successful in most cities. Although Indianapolis was having a problem filling health clinics to capacity in 1972, its dental and eye care services were considerably overtaxed. Boston, too, found its three health centers underutilized in the first two years; but, it did not take long to go from 18,000 clients in 1971 to 68,000 in 1972. In fact, this program which offers comprehensive family care in a simple, coordinated fashion under one roof—where you can deal with a headache and the anxiety that caused it and the unemployment problem that caused the anxiety in the first place—is perhaps Boston's most successful effort.

Boston's program has demonstrated two particular things: (1) a model of cooperation between public and private sectors, and (2) the training and creative use of community people. For the first time physicians and hospitals are deeply involved in and sincerely trying to solve community health care problems. And trained resident technicians are helping other residents. On the other hand, even greater private commitment and resources are needed. There are suggestions that the mayor, too, needs to get more deeply involved, encourage greater participation by the private sector, and sell the program. For example, effective advertising is needed to reach the mass of people on the benefits of preventive care; pay incentives are needed to attract and retain skilled physicians. None of these problems is impossible to solve. Furthermore, only a small increase in the budget for these items could preserve this program for the long-range future.

Interestingly, these same types of problems are manifest in other health programs as well—that is, lack of adequate funding, understaffing and underpay, second-hand equipment, less than ideal facilities, and, rather than assistance, usually non-constructive criticism from the established medical societies about the quality of treatment. This is true in Indianapolis where residents nevertheless prefer the neighborhood centers to the almost inaccessible private doctor's offices or Marion County General Hospital, which involves a difficult bus ride and long waits. In spite of the problems, public health administrators there feel that neighborhood centers are not only vital but show the way to more effective methods of treating the entire population.

Newark.—Newark has had an especially difficult time developing an effective health program; yet, it has made impressive progress, since 1972. A report by the Center for Analysis of Public Issues at Princeton [2] points out how clients must go to a multitude of institutions (mostly long established, traditional agencies) to receive health care and, in many instances, not receive any treatment. It argues that the same amount of public health money can buy effective care merely by reshuffling priorities and using neighborhood centers. Model Cities is supporting the recommendations and has proceeded to develop health centers. The first, Gladys Dickinson Health Station, served over 7,500 clients in the first year and will function as a model for what Model Cities hopes will be "seven to ten additional health centers." However, this will never happen without the use of general revenue sharing funds and other new sources. But already revenue sharing is scheduled for budget balancing and cutting an excessive property tax rate.

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[2] *The Doctor is Out*, A Report on the Newark, New Jersey Division of Health, Center for Analysis of Public Issues, Princeton, New Jersey, March, 1972.

Another major health program is the Interim Direct Dental Care Project which provides dental insurance and ear and eye testing to 8,000 children in five Model Schools. However, even with this service, surveys show the need is so great that tens of thousands of school children receive no dental care at all during their elementary school years. Traditional health care institutions are practically moribund. But recognizing the seriousness of the problem, Mayor Gibson gave the city's health program a shot-in-the-arm by appointing a new director of health and welfare. In Newark's case, Model Cities has been instrumental in providing much of the resources to help the city; however, there would be little progress without the assistance of some private institutions and the election of a new mayor interested in the cause.

Dayton.—The Comprehensive Health Center in Dayton is one of four non-profit corporations. The contract for renovation of the center was awarded through a negotiated bid process so that the door was opened for the first time to minority contractors by means of alleviating some of the experience requirements. The center started with serious administrative difficulties, including the necessity of dismissing its first director, but new staffing has been its salvation. Because it has been in operation only since October 1971, it has not had sufficient time to work out all the kinks; however, city officials feel it is a successful project.

Chicago.—In Chicago, Model Cities funds have been used to start four health centers: remodeling of the Epstein Clinic at Providence Hospital to serve the Near South; building a center in Uptown designed to handle 25,000 persons; and two centers under development in the Mid-South area to handle 11,000 clients each. In spite of this dramatic increase in facilities, these centers will only be able to handle about ten percent of those needing care.

In addition to the centers, the city has instituted an innovative and effective ambulance project which serves over 7,000 patients annually.

As a result of the health programs, several institutional changes have occurred: (1) medical professionals have accepted the neighborhood center concept, (2) citizens are now involved on boards running the centers, and (3) for the first time, an overall citizen board is advising the commissioner of the Board of Health.

However, the city's program still faces difficulties because Board of Health leadership remains docile—even after Model Cities convinced Mayor Daley to appoint a new health director. The new director has relegated the advisory board to a largely meaningless role, not much different, however, from other advisory boards in Chicago.

There are other problems too: (1) a short supply of technical help and (2) less than the best available care to the poor because the system is not integrated with private health care and the most effective, latest techniques. Nevertheless, several giant steps have been taken to provide decent health care for the poor. Further incentives to attract top quality physicians and the best private health care could substantially improve the program.

New York.—In New York, health programs have been less successful. Model Cities was not able to get its health centers started until the fourth action year because of delays in renovating facilities and general bureaucratic hangups. Its most successful health projects have been in

training paraprofessionals, establishing an alcoholic center in Harlem, and providing free ambulance service to model area residents.

Education Programs

Model Cities education projects have experienced less success than health projects for a number of reasons: (1) difficulty of establishing model schools comparable to model health centers due to the extraordinary personnel costs per capita attached to education, (2) greater independence of school systems and their sensitivities to interference by local government officials, (3) difficulty of measuring educational achievement levels, and (4) persistent arguments among scholars and technicians about which programs do the most good.

Many of the Model Cities communities developed projects in areas which they felt would make immediate improvements, such as: more training for teachers; greater number of quality teachers; special programming for the slow and fast learners; involvement of parents; a voice for citizens; and, opening the schools to adult education and other community programs.

Chicago.—Of the education programs in Chicago, the impact of the Schomes (amalgam of school and home) community school project—operating in seven schools—has been felt throughout the school system. This Model Cities program has demonstrated to the Board of Education the value of various educational techniques, such as resident aides, increased teacher training, citizen advisory boards, adult education, better learning environments (for 10,000 children), free meals (for 20,000), and parental involvement. In some instances, results have been better than expected. The Educational Testing Service of Barton-Aschman Associates, Inc. believes that citywide achievement test scores of pupils in these schools reported during the Model Cities third action year "give rise to the hope that the steady downward trend in academic achievement has been halted." In fact, the Board of Education would like to institutionalize the program citywide as a regular part of the system, but it lacks the funds. The director of Model Cities, Erwin France, describes the program as an excellent example of "buying into the system" to create institutional change; but, he admits that there are still problems in the program. Not enough parents have gotten involved in an in-depth way and it is still difficult to get widespread community support for Schomes. On the other hand, they have made impressive advances.

Dayton, Savannah, Seattle and Indianapolis.—Many of the cities have developed various components of the community school concept, although none as comprehensively or as successfully as Chicago's. Dayton, Savannah, Seattle, and Indianapolis, for example, have all extended regular school hours to adults for evening classes, involved parents to a greater extent in the schools than previously, provided funds for teacher training, and developed special courses for drop-outs and slow students. Of these cities, Seattle has probably progressed further because of its intense efforts on individualized instruction, continuous progress curricula, innovative teaching techniques, and related health and social welfare services. Furthermore, over 200 Seattle parents are actively involved in classroom activities (as instructors and testers), and in community development, fund raising, and project evaluation. Indianapolis has had serious problems in getting adults

to attend classes and in stimulating residents to participate in academic and vocational curricula as opposed to recreational programs. However, parental advisory councils have been added in eight of the model schools, elaborate programs have been designed to raise the achievement levels of model neighborhood students to the citywide level. Results of these efforts will have to wait for later evaluation.

Boston.—In Boston, the most visibly successful education programs have been for adults. Most impressive has been the stimulation of a consortium of colleges to unite for the first time to provide unusual and exceptional educational services to the community. Important inroads for institutional change have occurred through the placement of low-income adults in college, changing curricula to suit the needs of the population, and making credit-gaining policies more flexible.

Newark.—Newark too has developed some innovative education programs, including model schools. Of moderate success are five model schools which are concentrating on improving reading and math skills for 8,000 students. Each school has an elected, joint faculty-community advisory committee, plus psychological and guidance services for pupils. The Model Cities Office of Program and Staff Development (OPSD)—funded by Model Cities but responsible to both the superintendent of schools and the CDA—is attempting to focus on the important issues. It believes, for example that the schools cannot be upgraded unless the fundamental system is changed, teachers are taught the skills necessary to teach well, more positive attitudes prevail, and teachers receive monthly evaluations to improve their performance. But leadership in the school system is weak, and there are too many things left to be done in this program to call it successful. City officials believe it is still not much more than a "Title I Project" or a block grant of $100 per pupil. It has not attacked the fundamental problems it believes to be so important. Model Cities money could be used more wisely here as a catalyst.

Manpower and Economic Development

Training and job development have had but limited success in Model Cities programs. Although considerable funds were committed for manpower programs in some of the cities, there were few results. A major difficulty has been the high unemployment rates in the nation's cities and the much higher rates in the model neighborhoods. Experience has demonstrated that training does little good without jobs at the end.

The Model Cities economic development programs have not helped much in creating employment because they have involved only a small number of businesses and with little exception, the types which employ few people—the "Mom and Pop" stores. Furthermore, by initially concentrating in the target areas instead of the region, chances for success were considerably reduced. Special problems were raised by such narrow concentration: ineffective or improper zoning for commercial and industrial development, too narrow a market, insufficient capital or outside investment interests, limited technical skills and business experience within the area, and a shortage of existing facilities in which to locate larger businesses. Many of these problems have been alleviated as cities have proceeded to go citywide with their programs. But the Model Cities experience has demonstrated that it is to the disadvantage of the target area to try to confine economic

development to an area short of resources and technical assistance.

Newark's Goals vis-a-vis Problems.—The total job money in Newark was an impressive $30 million in 1972. Mayor Gibson's two major job goals are impressive also: (1) to employ 12,000 residents and (2) to enforce the city's affirmative action plans, which stipulate that 50 percent minority apprentices and 30 percent minority journeymen must be employed in all construction trades. (In 1972, there were only 70 blacks out of 11,350 construction trade union members.) But with cutbacks in manpower funds, it will be even more difficult for Gibson to achieve his goals. However, he has made substantial progress in gaining minority hiring concessions from six airlines in the development of Newark's new international airport, and the airline industry has agreed to finance a $2 million basic construction skills training program for minorities. Nevertheless, the lack of other major construction jobs will hurt. And Model Cities, with its limited economic development funds, could hardly be expected to make an impact in this regard.

Furthermore, the city has been unable to operate its federal Public Employment Program (PEP) successfully, largely because it has treated the jobs as meaningless part-time employment, with political patronage as the prime motivator. To underscore this, each city councilman was given a quota of people they could hire for the program.[1]

Seattle's Modest Success.—Most Model Cities are still in the process of developing one-stop comprehensive employment centers, and results have been mixed. Seattle's Employment Unicenter is one of the most successful nationally; yet, it too has had its share of difficulties. A joint board—comprised of state and city officials and model neighborhood residents—has made it possible to get the participation of all the principal manpower agencies; however, it has not yet resulted in the kind of coordination necessary to avert duplication of effort and build a system responsive to the disadvantaged. Its major components are only in the early stages of development. These include a unified management information system, Minority Skill Bank, common referral forms, and a health services plan. The most crucial difficulties appear to be the lack of a single, strong administrative unit and the hesitancy on the part of individual agencies to relinquish their autonomy for the benefit of a unified system. The apparent needs are for the participating agencies to commit themselves to the actions and policies of the board and secondly to a single administrator with responsibility to direct all personnel in the center.

In spite of these difficulties, the Unicenter has elicited more coordination and cooperation out of agencies than has existed before. Moreover, Model Cities and city officials are taking concrete steps to correct the deficiencies by following up on evaluation reports. However, more time is needed to correct mistakes, as well as a strong effort from state officials to simplify their own manpower structure and direct their agencies to cooperate.

As already indicated, Model Cities manpower programs have been vitally concerned about hiring minorities. Seattle is one of the few cities which has succeeded in establishing a fair record, particularly

[1] PEP is not a Model Cities program, but it has had considerable effect on what Model Cities was able to do with the unemployed from the target areas. New York and Newark failed miserably, for example, while Seattle and St. Louis were highly successful—proving once again that failure is usually not due to program design but to the administration of it.

in the hiring of minorities in the construction industry. In 1972, it had 454 minority persons (or 17.5 percent of the city's total) in construction jobs. One of Model Cities' accomplishments includes approval by the Seattle Board of Workers to allow various project staff to hold pre-award conferences with contractors on city jobs. In the past, conferences were held after contracts were awarded. The new scheme has resulted in project staff approving 39 contracts and turning down four.

In economic development—even though most of Seattle's efforts have resulted in "Mom and Pop" type businesses—12 minority construction contracts have been financed with Model Cities backing, and several large performance bonds (one for 748,000 and another for $1 million) have been obtained in support of the contractors. Also a number of businesses have been developed in such fields as printing, a shopping center, frozen foods, and specialty food processing.

Dayton's Progress.—Dayton has had its share of problems with manpower programs. One of its most serious difficulties has been with the Manpower Center—a non-profit corporation and its major employment project. The first two directors were fired for incompetency, and the center never succeeded in developing "one-stop" (all agencies under one roof) objectives. The Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), working in conjunction with Model Cities, has had even greater problems. It fired four directors, lost important records, and has been faced with general administrative inadequacies from the beginning. Nevertheless, with all its faults, each year some 400 to 500 persons have received training, and records show that as high as 85 percent of these have been placed in jobs. The CDA believes most of the problems have finally been worked out.

Economic development projects have not advanced very far, with some notable exceptions. Perhaps the most highly successful example is the Unity State Bank, a black enterprise supported by Model Cities. It received almost no assistance from other lending institutions of the business community; nevertheless, it is prospering and now plans to open a downtown branch. In respect to progress in other economic projects, the city feels it may be able to show considerably more success as it proceeds to develop enterprises citywide under Planned Variations.

New York City's Multiple Problems.—Manpower programs in New York have been ineffective almost across the board. Of all the projects, health career training has shown the greatest potential for success because it was designed to train for meaningful jobs—ones where openings actually exist. Yet, even here only 50 percent of the enrollees have stayed in the program. And by the middle of 1972, only 100 persons had been graduated—a small effort in solving this great city's unemployment problems.

Clerical training, operated by the Chamber of Commerce, also was provided built-in potential for success because it was practically guaranteed job placement for those who completed the course; yet, in 1972, only 94 remained out of 842 who entered the program.

The biggest training project, Job Training, was less successful. Its budget for the first two years was $7,917,000; but by the end of the first year, it graduated less than 400 trainees and placed fewer than 150 in jobs—an unusually high cost-benefit ratio. Furthermore, the program has had difficulty in finding and keeping a reliable operator.

On the other side, a much smaller job training program operated by the Urban Coalition in Harlem is reported by the CDA evaluation unit as operating efficiently and effectively.

One of the unfortunate aspects of New York's Model Cities manpower program has been too heavy a reliance on trying to develop career-ladders (permanent city job slots where employees have a chance to advance) in municipal departments. The problems started when the unions rebelled and then the courts upheld them against what they called favoritism to get model neighborhood residents on the civil service lists. The unions called it discrimination in reverse. As a consequence, millions of dollars have been spent on jobs for Model Cities residents in mostly useless and unproductive training slots, almost all of which will end as soon as Model Cities' money dries up. Not all has been wasted, however, because a sizable segment of the unemployed was hired for jobs, and a good portion of the money—$17,000,000—was used for special sanitation and clean-up programs. But it looks like no one will come out with permanent jobs from this effort.

On the other side, the community service officers, hired to work in Housing Authority projects, are in a useful program, strongly regarded by residents and the police. The fire inspector's training program is also rated above average by residents and fire department employees, who appreciate extra inspection help. However, there has been little pressure to break down the traditional hiring processes or lower the qualifications for recruiting police and firemen; these unions are too powerful and controversial.

As far as intervening to get jobs for minorities in the outside construction unions, Model Cities has not even tried. On the other hand, the city has been no more successful. Mayor Lindsay and the Building and Construction Trades Council agreed to the New York Plan, calling for 800 trainees annually, but by the end of the first year less than half that number were in training and only 22 persons permitted to form unions.

Chicago First in Innovation and State Cooperation in Manpower Centers.—Chicago reached agreement early with the Illinois State Employment Service and other agencies to locate manpower offices in the city's community action (OEO) funded multi-service centers. In fact, it led the federal government in these innovations. Instead of creating separate manpower or health centers, large comprehensive centers were developed to handle all social services. (The negative aspect of the program is the size of the centers. In some cases, the centers have turned into additional bureaucracies—the very thing the program was trying to avoid.) In 1972, Model Cities appropriated funds for four additional but smaller multi-service centers to serve each model neighborhood, and they will include manpower programs.

Model Cities has played a minor role in helping to get minorities into the construction trades. The city made an effort to do something about the problem in the Chicago Plan which called for 4000 minority trainees. But this plan fell apart. By July, 1972, a new plan was being developed.

Savannah Needs Prodding.—Savannah has been successful in bringing together manpower agencies under one roof, such as the Georgia Department of Labor, State Office of Rehabilitation Services, and Savannah-Chatham Board of Education. However, not all agencies

are cooperating and there is no single effective administration. In Savannah, there were no major breakthroughs in minority hiring in the construction trades well into 1973. And there were no signs that any would take place either.

Indianapolis—Leadership From the Top.—Indianapolis' Comprehensive Manpower Center has had serious difficulties. Evaluation of the center by the city's Community Services Program in 1972, reported that "internal disorders resulting from lack of staff communication, and top administrative disinterest, reflected upon the poor achievement of project objectives." Ever since, improvements have been underway, including staff restructuring, new lines of authority to the Metropolitan Manpower Commission, and realistic project objectives. Here the mayor and his top administrators are proving that they can turn a less than successful venture into a successful one, without dismantling the entire program.

In regards to minority hiring in the construction trades, Model Cities has mostly taken a back seat, mainly because this type of activity takes collective bargaining and leadership from a wide variety of people, including elected officials, business and unions, and residents. On the other hand, the city has made progress in its Indianapolis Plan (rated by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance as one of the best two in the nation in 1971) because of its ability to pull the collective leaders together.

Other Model Cities Projects

Although this review cannot discuss all the numerous Model Cities projects, a brief look at the highlights of some of the remaining programs should serve to portray the extent of the Model Cities Program and what was expected of it.[4]

Housing.—Housing and neighborhood conditions are the first thing the eye sees and it is from this physical appearance that many judge the quality of life because it is the most noticeable. But if one were to assess improvements from this alone, he probably would not get very far from a zero score, for there have been few physical changes in the model neighborhoods. The occasional new multi-service center or paved street is hidden amongst the massiveness of housing deterioration. And housing programs seem to take the longest to develop, about three to four years from planning to building. Some urban renewal projects took ten and fifteen years to develop and many cleared acres still sit idle, so it is hardly fair to expect that Model Cities would revolutionize this process.

Construction and rehabilitation of housing are more costly than any other function. Model Cities could have spent all its money in this way with nothing left for other programs, and made little impact on neighborhood appearance. Cities, therefore, simply decided to demonstrate possibilities and act as catalysts for not-for-profit housing development corporations. But too few houses were built to make a difference.

By the middle of the fourth action year, almost all cities in this study had only 50 or 100 houses under new construction and not many

[4] For further details, see the case histories in *Model Cities Impact on Better Communities: Case Studies of Eight Cities*, by George J. Washnis (forthcoming from Praeger Publishers).

more under rehabilitation. In new construction, Seattle had 38 units, Boston 129, Chicago 25, Indianapolis a development loan for 65 units, Savannah none, Dayton 137, Newark still in the planning stage, and New York, the largest number, over 1200, mainly because it got an early start with other HUD housing money. Model Cities acted as the catalyst.

In New York, by January 1971, there were 9,993 low-income units and 669 moderate-income units under construction, and another 4,100 units of low-income and 7,300 units of moderate income in planning; but, these could not be attributed to the Model Cities Program. In the Brownsville Model Cities area, often described as the "slum-of-slums," there was not a single housing start by January, 1972.

Newark has taken two big steps in housing: (1) in rehabilitation and (2) planning of a proposed $389 million new town-in-town in the eastern end of the model neighborhood, for which Model Cities has already allocated $4,077,497. There are 500 homes under rehabilitation and 2,000 more assigned to private developers. The Housing Development and Rehabilitation Corporation—established by Model Cities is perhaps the program's most successful component. At one time the city was assured of receiving $50 million for its rehabilitation program, but federal budget cuts have reduced this drastically.

In rehabilitation, except for Boston and New York, other cities in this study are not doing much. By early 1972, Boston had 719 housing units in the pipeline and New York had 1,031 units under rehabilitation and another 2,400 in planning. New York's biggest housing tragedy has been the Emergency Repair Program (which Model Cities entered after the program was in operation for several years under the city's Housing and Development Administration), which ended up in bribes, kickbacks, and millions of wasted dollars. This same type of program has also experienced difficulty in several other cities (not in this study); however, this does not reduce the need for the program or the ability of well managed cities to operate it properly.

Public Facilities and Social Services.—Most of the cities put money into community facilities. Seattle was particularly proficient at this. It built over 15 parks and playgrounds; added $85,000 of new street lighting, $66,000 of underground wiring, and $225,000 of utility upgrading; and completed many other projects for the model neighborhood. It is now developing a series of multiservice centers and other socially oriented facilities.

Almost all of the cities have constructed or plan to construct elaborate community facilities. Chicago is proceeding to build four $2.5 million multi-service centers in the four model neighborhoods; Indianapolis already has four centers; Dayton is building a million dollar comprehensive social service center; and Savannah has rehabilitated an old building for this purpose.

Newark has placed a large share of its funds in new street lighting, new street signs, tot lots, improved refuse collection, and four Action Now centers. It has also allocated over $1 million for three multipurpose centers. The city's biggest problem has been its inability to select competent and dedicated people to run these programs properly. The right programs have been selected but few function well. And maintenance and follow-up are poor (typical, however, in most cities). Playgrounds and certain other facilities have been allowed to deteri-

orate to the point of non-use and community disgrace, largely because of the hurry to spend money and build things and the lack of concern for providing ongoing, long-range funds to keep the facilities in decent condition.

Law and Justice.—All the cities have developed projects designed to reduce crime. Perhaps the most comprehensive is Newark's law and justice program. In June 1972, Eugene Doleschol, director of the Information Center at the National Commission on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD), stated that Newark is one of three cities that stands out above all others when its Model Cities criminal justice projects are examined from a city point of view rather than project-by-project. He stated that Newark administers the most well-rounded program, outstanding "because of the comprehensiveness of its approach, its planning and coordination, the sophistication of its programs, and its fiscal skill in using Model Cities seed money to attract . . . other funds." [5]

An idea of the program's comprehensiveness may be derived from an outline of projects. As a master project, Newark's Comprehensive Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Planning Project coordinates subprojects. The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Strategy Program consolidates existing and new juvenile delinquency projects. The Youth Service Agency plans, operates, and coordinates community-based youth services that operate from youth centers. The Pilot Project in Pre-Adolescent Services is part of a national strategy of the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration (YDDPA), in which Newark and 15 other cities have been selected to develop and implement comprehensive demonstration programs. Another body, the Narcotics Advisory and Rehabilitation Council, consolidates five narcotic prevention and treatment programs. Legal services for residents, three police storefronts safety lighting, miniature teletype units in patrol cars, walkie-talkies for the Police Tactical Squad, and an electronic stenographic system are all part of the program. As is indicative of these projects, funds for Newark's programs have not all gone to hardware, a common complaint about law enforcement projects in many other cities.

Certain other cities have done fairly well with their Model Cities criminal justice money also. Seattle has developed an outstanding Public Defender program under a non-profit corporation, which is attending to 45,000 needy cases annually never before serviced. Most of the cities have developed half-way houses for ex-convicts, drug addicts, alcoholics, and youth offenders. Chicago has developed six police community centers and two youth correction service centers. It also has 486 police-community aides who assist the police in minor duties. They have mainly, however, succeeded in developing better police community relations and calmer neighborhoods. The quality of centers and the performance of police community aides in the cities are mixed. In many cases, for example, police aides have not been fully trained or integrated into police departments. And too often they are given unproductive and unrewarding assignments.

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[5] Eugene Doleschol, *Criminal Justice Programs in Model Cities*, Crime and Delinquency Literature, Volume 4, No. 2, June 1972, pp. 318–321.

Again, in emphasis of the importance of sound management, when there is good administration and leadership from the top, programs run better. Where there is not, it is difficult to see where greater local discretion to make decisions will help.

Conclusion

In order to reach its quality of life goals, the Model Cities Program believed it needed to attack all problems, and at the same time. This has had the effect of diluting funds so that it has been difficult to show an impact in any one function. On the other hand, the wide range of programs has provided valuable demonstrations of what the urban areas need and what might work. This latter experience has probably been more worthwhile than what would have been derived from a concentration of funds in only a few functions, for then Model Cities would have been much like categorical grants without the benefit of flexible and innovative monies.

As stated previously, we believe that smaller amounts of money should have been used in many of the questionable, experimental areas, with larger doses applied to the top priorities. In any event, there was never enough money to reach the critical mass—to substantially solve problems—in any function. And now, to the demise of cities and counties the debate has unwittingly switched from the need for resources to the structure of the revenue process. Nevertheless, the nation will shortly have to think seriously about the level of resources needed to solve its problems.

This study shows that very few cities have been able to achieve success in all service areas. On the other hand, it reveals examples of individual project successes which could very well be expanded citywide or the experiences transferred to other jurisdictions which might benefit. In this respect, one must not lose sight of the importance of trying to make specific projects in the neighborhoods successful, where this potential exists. In this way residents may continue to receive services they need, regardless of some failures about them. In the meantime, further improvements can come about through additional federal incentives, local leadership, better city management, and a concerned citizenry.

V. Citizen Participation

Citizen participation has been perhaps the most controversial feature of the Model Cities Program. It has had successes and failures. And although Model Cities was designed to be the mayor's program, the unexpected determination of residents to wield a strong voice in the program changed the scope of priorities: Ever since, HUD has been trying to return the program to the chief executives but to maintain a meaningful and effective system of citizen participation.

Using Helpful Nomenclature

A useful classification of the relationships among citizens, staff and city officials was developed by Marshall Kaplan, Gans and Kahn in a study of the Model Cities planning process.[1] They placed planning in the context of five basic possibilities (with the likelihood of numerous variations): (1) *staff dominance*—strong control by staff, sustained chief executive interest, and citizen involvement primarily to legitimize the process; (2) *staff influence*—some staff involvement, minimal chief executive interest, and weak (non-cohesive and not politically integrated) resident involvement; (3) *parity*—acceptable levels of staff involvement, sustained chief executive interest, and cohesive, turbulent free citizen involvement; (4) *resident influence*—minimal staff and chief executive involvement, and usually a non-cohesive, mostly turbulent resident group, and finally (5) *resident dominance*—support from the chief executive and staff, and strong and cohesive—not necessarily politically integrated or turbulent—resident involvement. It is natural for these variables to interchange frequently, as political and social climates change.

Overview of Eight Cities

In the eight cities examined in this study, the range of diversity has varied from one extreme to another. Parity has been the case for both Seattle and Boston, and resident dominance—for much of the time—in both Dayton and New York. Staff dominance has existed in four cities: Chicago, Indianapolis, Savannah, and Newark.

Indianapolis emerged from a strong resident position to one of parity and then to staff dominance, as the professionals began to initiate, plan and manage almost all programs. There is a feeling now that it may have again moved to a position of parity.

Until recently, Newark's staff dominance did not mean mayoral or city hall control but rather the overpowering elusiveness, independence and secrecy of the CDA director and a few staff members. In Chicago and Savannah, staff dominance has never been questioned.

Dayton is another story. Many observers would call this system resident dominance because of a powerful, rather independent citizen's

[1] *The Model Cities Program, A Comparative Analysis of the Planning Process in Eleven Cities*, Marshall Kaplan Gans and Kahn Associates also completed studies of 21 Model Cities in 1972 and a survey of 147 cities in 1973, making use of the same terminology. They also conclude that findings in the later studies are essentially the same as the early work.

board, which has had veto power over any action in the model neighborhood. Yet the city staff has been influential enough to prevent things from getting completely out-of-control.

In New York the dominance of residents was countermanded by a much stronger staff role. The resident groups are presently non-cohesive and non-turbulent.

Chicago: Staff Dominance

Under the powerful leadership of Mayor Daley, citizens in Chicago have been unable to effectively challenge city hall control. In the early days of Model Cities—when HUD was pushing for greater citizen involvement—Mayor Daley sternly warned HUD Secretary George Romney and Regional Director Francis Fisher that the federal government was not going to tell him how to run his city. But after some federal pressures and a recommendation from a blue-ribbon committee he appointed, Community Improvement Advisory Committee (used as the Workable Program Advisory Committee), he agreed to the concept of citizen involvement and declared that 50 percent of Model Cities Board members would be elected and 50 percent appointed, as long as he made the appointments. In Chicago's one-sided, politically dominated system, this meant the Democratic Organization would win almost all elective seats and Mayor Daley would need to make only one or two appointments in each area to control the board; only in the Woodlawn area did the anti-Daley forces gain a significant voice.

This obsession by city hall for control led to one of the highest votes of any Model Cities program in the nation. Daley marshalled precinct workers and his whole political machinery to "get out the vote"; consequently, over 30 percent of eligible voters participated, compared to five and ten percent in most cities.

In spite of the unfavorable odds against citizen control, residents have been given more power than ever before and more than any other official body in the city. For example, the city's war-on-poverty program—Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity (CCUO)—has always been a city operation without citizen control, symbolically guided by a blue-ribbon board appointed by the mayor. The CCUO local boards have dealt mainly with less important problems revolving around neighborhood centers. But in the Model Cities program, local political analysts believe that Mayor Daley's strategy—to appoint half of the Model Cities membership—was designed to provide broader participation rather than to gain control. If all board members had been elected, Daley's political apparatus could have easily won the majority, if not all members in three of the areas. The appointment process has allowed the Model Cities director, Erwin France, to recommend qualified persons to the mayor from a wide variety of sources. And although there is little question that all major discisions are made from Daley's office, a good deal of what the boards recommend is accepted. For the first time, citizens are actually contributing ideas and determining neighborhood priorities. As a result, the pendulum of success or failure for citizen participation in Chicago has swung to the positive side.

Indianapolis

Staff Dominance or Parity.—Indianapolis has a strongly oriented staff program but it also has considerable input from citizens. Citizens

assume mostly a secondary role because of lack of staff for the Model Cities Board and because the city hall staff is exceptionally competent and far ahead in its planning. The substance of plans and new program ideas are generated mainly from city hall. Indeed, some key residents feel that the neighborhood task force proposals, as restructured by technicians, distort their views. In the second and third action years, Model Cities Board members continued to express a belief that they were receiving only token recognition from the mayor's office. They particularly resented strong city hall control over fiscal, personnel, and policy matters.

Part of the problem stems from the fact that the board itself has been split most of the time. There have been serious factional disputes and, moreover, there are questions about whether the board fairly represents the community. For example, when elections were due in the spring of 1971, the board balked, pointing out that there was not enough time to show program effectiveness and, therefore, this might hurt their chances for re-election. Mayor Lugar finally threatened to cut off the $75 monthly stipend paid to neighborhood members if an election were not held. It finally took place February 4, 1972, resulting in a more cohesive, less turbulent board.

Although characterized by staff dominance, program administrators in Indianapolis have nurtured channels of communication and participation. For example, the city requires program approval by both the neighborhood planning councils and the CDA Board. In explaining the effectiveness of this process, David Meeker, former deputy mayor of Community Services (the department under which Model Cities falls), stated that all past board proposals have been accepted by Mayor Lugar and that the mayor insists he will support any program receiving substantial citizen acceptance—not merely board endorsement. Their philosophy is designed to encourage greater participation. Furthermore, there is a community feeling that city officials are genuinely attempting to develop an acceptable process, even though it is one designed by city hall. On the whole, in spite of past difficulties, the system is operating successfully.

Planned Variations.—Under Planned Variations, although the model neighborhood continues to enjoy the special position as an impact area (with the same level of funding), Indianapolis has taken steps to include other disadvantaged areas in its redevelopment plans. A Mayor's Task Force on Community Services is engaged in making recommendations for additional areas to be included in the plan based on two major criteria: (1) availability of resources so that the required impact can be achieved; and, (2) existence of a viable citizen participation organization within the community and completion of a sound planning process. The relationship to the city's overall strategy is taken into consideration in designing the plan. This includes a policy of expansion until the central business district is largely surrounded and the entire "inner city" is designated as model neighborhoods.

Initial expansion is taking place in the Highland-Brookside neighborhood, which has a sub-area plan approved in 1969 by a local citizen participation structure—the Near East Side Community Organization (NESCO). NESCO was selected by a Neighborhood Congress, which is comprised of 140 formal representatives appointed by 70

different citizen groups. In February 1972, $3 million in projects was approved for Highland-Brookside and $3.75 million set aside for all other neighborhoods in the Inner Need Area. The city has committed itself to an effective citizen participation program and certification of recognized citizen units on a citywide basis.

Savannah: Staff Dominance

Another system dominated by the CDA staff and city officials is Savannah. There was little history of citizen involvement prior to the Model Cities Community Action Programs. Apathy and alienation have been the rule, with residents under the belief that their ideas would be of little value and probably would not be considered anyway. It was not surprising that there was no clamor from residents to bring Model Cities to Savannah. Indeed, it was up to the city manager to initiate the planning and convince an overly conservative city council (there is now another, more liberal council) that the money would be an economic advantage to the city—much like a new industry. It was the Model Cities planning process, the workshops and resident training (the latter, conducted by Savannah State College and the University of Georgia) which led to the active involvement of once passive residents. Former City Manager Picot Floyd, even today, is highly impressed with this successful mobilization, declaring the active development of the Model Cities Neighborhood Council as the most significant accomplishment of the Savannah program. Although he feels this new political maturity will continue to grow, there are those who are skeptical of the intentions of certain elected officials to nurture this rather successful development process. As one alderman put it, "It would be no great loss if Model Cities fell." Responsible local observers believe that a "no strings attached" special revenue sharing package would very likely let it fall, along with five years of citizen growth and motivation.

Like other programs, this one has had its probems. The Model Cities Neighborhood Council was legitimately elected through a community convention process of several meetings, which drew as many as 1,000 persons. But factional disputes disrupted the board during the various periods of its history, and arguments about not hiring enough residents slowed the program. The board's executive director was fired for mis-management and unethical practice. Eventually, the city was forced to place tighter controls on operations, and ever since, things have run more smoothly.

The Savannah experience, like many others, points out the need for city guidance through growth periods. With this kind of administrative leadership, this program continues to improve, projects are operating near capacity, and participants are growing, a sense of community is apparent, and (as observed by a local official) there are more blacks in local government (many in key positions) than would have been employed in 10 to 15 years without Model Cities.

Although Savannah was not fortunate enough to fall under the Planned Variations program, the CDA staff (in anticipation of revenue sharing) proposed that the city extend citizen participation citywide and expand resources to all 11 poverty areas outside the model neighborhood. They recommended that one representative be elected to a Community Advisory Council for each 1,000 residents living in the poverty areas. However, until more is learned about the status of

revenue sharing, city council has postponed any decisions on this plan. In brief, many believe that without a requirement for citizen participation, the city fathers may drop the idea even though it is judged to be perhaps the city's most important accomplishment.

Newark: Staff Dominance

Newark started out under city hall control and practically no citizen influence. With the election of Gibson, it turned to a staff dominant program, but still with executive leadership and weak citizen involvement. The CDA not only controlled the citizen participation process, but to the annoyance of city officials, remained almost completely independent of city operations, proceeding to create a "shadow government." The director during this period, Junius Williams, believed that citizen participation would be more effective by employing model neighborhood residents in key positions rather than developing a strong citizen board—in direct disregard to a management philosophy which supports a clear distinction between elected policy makers and staff. Some local people were employed in important positions but many principals were not city residents, anyway. Most damaging, the approach resulted in a weak citizen board—one which was unable to develop legitimacy, influence city politics, or even keep tabs on what the director was doing.

From the beginning in 1968, Williams led a dissident group called Newark Area Planning Association (NAPA). They held an independent election outside federal guidelines which nearly cost Newark its first year funding. However, HUD merely nullified the election. A second election was held which drew about 6,000 voters and used regular city voting machines. But the second council was too big (52 members) and was inflicted with severe racial splits and calculated control from city hall—directed by then Mayor Hugh J. Addonizo. Addonizo moved decisively to gain control of the Model Neighborhood Council by offering jobs to its members and loading the entire agency with patronage employees. Naturally, citizen participation never got off the ground.

When Kenneth Gibson won election as mayor in 1970, he replaced almost all patronage employees with model neighborhood residents and committed himself to operating a "clean ship." However, the Model Neighborhood Council never developed any strength, even though it was granted veto power by city council. Its powers were diluted because everything it did was treated in a negative way. The CDA staff immersed it in the review of previous activities rather than concentrating its attention on new programs. Its decisions turned out to be untimely and unimportant. And by fall of 1972, the Model Neighborhood Council was not having any more success than it had in the beginning in controlling programs or influencing the largely independent CDA. Block clubs and district assembly meetings turned out to be the main source of citizen involvement. As time grew on, the community appeared even less motivated to improve itself, and citizen enclaves were battling among themselves. Gibson had to do something.

Planned Variations gave the mayor that chance. He began to plan and program citywide, and he also developed one citywide citizens advisory council of 27 members—18 appointed by the mayor and nine by city council. The Model Neighborhood Council has been abandoned

but the district assemblies continue to meet as a source of additional input. Moreover, although the new citywide council is merely advisory, some of the city staff believe it may become fairly influential if it can help to diffuse the highly volatile mix of mayor and city council. It could also assist in bringing some of the independent administrative units together under a strong mayor or business administrator. In effect, it could act in a capacity which the city council is unable to fulfill at this time because of its differences with the mayor.

Although the new citizen body has been given some staff, its lack of formal power might very well hurt its legitimacy and effectiveness over the long-run. Newark has been fooled so many times—by the selfish interests of some leaders, incompetency, and now a nationalistic fever—that it is running scared. It looks as if no substantial authority will be given to any citizen group until some of the major issues are solved.

Dayton: Resident Dominance

Dayton's citizen structure could very well be the strongest in the country. This is because of an "equal partnership" agreement which is respected by the residents and the city but which has not been passed into law, mainly because it would be illegal to give this much power away to a resident group. For a long time, the Model Cities Planning Council (MCPC—policy board) was almost as powerful as the city commission in Model Cities affairs. This local board has had a four-man staff, has developed its own programs, and has had virtual veto power over any proposal destined for the model neighborhood. Realizing that it had gone too far, the city commission was anxious to pull back when Planned Variations came in by declining to give the same latitude to five other citizen councils it had developed on its own initiative for the rest of the city. It justified giving extensive power to the mostly black model neighborhood because of historic inequities against minorities and the need for them to catch up. Despite the genuiness of this reasoning the city fathers were also trying to find a way out of diffusing their authority any further, for perhaps there would be no need for the city commission. They believe they have found a middle-ground in the new councils.

Nevertheless, the Model Cities Planning Council has been a valuable demonstration in power and organization. The system utilizes a pure election process and regular voting machines. The Planning Council's 27-members are elected from nine neighborhoods. During the first year, it had to fight for its legitimacy with city hall and groups from West Dayton who challenged it. For instance, the West Dayton Area Council—an umbrella group of organizations with a long history of involvement in the area—attacked the MCPC for not truly representing all the area's constituents, but preferred not to get involved itself because it believed the Planning Council to be dominated by a few spokesmen. Other groups complained that despite the high degree of organization and nine paid community organizers, citizen participation never did become widespread. It largely relied on leaflets and the "grapevine" for its communication. And the lack of participation was compounded by the chairman, Roger Prear, who surrounded himself with paramilitary black militants who frightened poor- and middle-class blacks and whites.

By the second year, a much more open chairman, George Washington, was elected, and the atmosphere improved, though still clouded by the presence of fear. During the whole period of development, middle-class blacks continually charged the city with racism for allowing the MCPC to openly flaunt sound and honest rules only so that the city could eventually claim control by default. However, from the city's point of view, officials did not want to intervene for fear of violating their "equal partnership" agreement. Nevertheless, it became apparent that some form of city intervention would have to take place; yet, it came only when additional resources from Planned Variations allowed it to go citywide. But the city commission has still not defined precise roles between itself and the Planning Council.

In spite of its problems with the Planning Council, for a long time the city had recognized the value of creating meaningful citizen structures in all sections of the community. Well before Planned Variations, it allocated $200,000 of city funds for this purpose. And under Planned Variations, an additional $2 million has been distributed to five elected councils on the basis of community need. Their less extensive power tends to balance that of the Planning Council, but includes such important things as developing a comprehensive plan and determining priorities for the use of money allocated to them. They also channel a great deal of attention to overall city goals and objectives, although each council meets directly with the city commission on its own problems. Staff assistance is provided by a "super CDA," under the direction of an assistant city manager.

New York: Resident Dominance vis-a-vis Staff Influence

Taking its clue from the Community Action Program, Model Cities in New York fell under resident dominance immediately. Initial feelings were that resident power was supposed to be on the same level for both programs. As the program ran into delays of up to a year or more and the inability of the city to spend half of its Model Cities money, the city blamed the residents and the residents blamed the city for the problems. But blame can be placed both on factional conflicts on the local boards and on the shoulders of city officials who refused to resolve problems and move the program along early enough.

To begin with, Mayor Lindsay placed Model Cities under a weak executive secretary and a committee of powerless and disinterested city commissioners, who ended up sending their subordinates to meetings. Policy decisions were really made by the three local directors and three Model Cities Policy Committees (MCPC) from three different boroughs. Although the committees did not possess final decision-making authority, they had informal veto power through their ability to hold up projects they did not like, and the city usually gave them their way. What was called Model Cities "partnership" turned out to be local board dominance and demands for things the city did not want. And there was a general concern that Model Cities might get as independent and powerful as the community action corporations, with little room for city participation.

Well into the first action year, the program dragged along. Mayor Lindsay finally had to face up to the fact that it was necessary to move control in the direction of city hall, confront community opposition, and direct the bureaucracy to cooperate. It was at this stage that the

bureaucracy was holding up progress as much as anybody else, particularly such departments as budget, real estate, and personnel and investigations. The delays prompted the Brooklyn Policy Committee to stage a to-day sit-in in December 1969, charging that the system had allowed them to spend only a fraction of their alloted $29 million, while the first action year was nearly half over. The other two model neighborhood groups were even in worse shape in their ability to operate programs and spend agency money. The city decided it was time to follow a report of reorganization prepared by the McKinsey consulting firm of New York.

Mayor Lindsay issued an executive order making Model Cities an administration and placing it under the direction of a strong administrator and a newly appointed central board of citizens. The administrative arrangements seemed to work well, but the new board was underutilized and consistently bypassed. The program's administrator, Joseph Williams, called the board into session only twice in two years, a defunct operation for all practical purposes. On the other side, Williams has proved to be an effective and strong administrator, managing key aspects of the program himself, and unafraid to make unpopular decisions even in the face of community opposition. And local Policy Committees have continued to be the source for citizen input, although their powers have been largely diluted.

As it happened, most people behind the Policy Committees never truly represented their communities anyway. To correct this, new elections were called in 1972, with the guidelines designed to include representation from the young and aged and a limit on the number of "povertycrats" (those in the OEO poverty programs) who could serve, so that a few "professional spokesmen" would not be able to control the boards. The elections corrected some of the abuses, but even today there are overlapping controlling memberships with a few people nominating the Policy Committees. In any event, dual elections and dual structures—the anti-poverty corporations and Model Cities Committees—have created two power structures in the poor communities, a duplication of services, and a great deal of wasted citizen efforts. This system has merely diffused power and caused frustrations. Model Cities has been able to achieve the degree of coordination and cooperation necessary to improve neighborhood organization.

To create some harmony out of the proliferation of neighborhood groups and to develop an effective participation structure, Mayor Lindsay proposed a citywide system of neighborhood government in 1972. Later that year, the Scott Commission, appointed by Governor Nelson Rockefeller, recommended a system of neighborhood government with even greater power than Lindsay's proposal. And now a newly appointed Charter Commission is looking into the possibilities of decentralization, hoping to come out with a report by 1974. The city is presently engaged in a pilot project in eight districts, designed to demonstrate the effects of decentralized administrative control under a district manager and single responsible citizen body in each area. To a large extent, these moves toward neighborhood government have come about because of the experiences of the Community Action and Model Cities Programs.

Boston's System of Parity

A system of parity—that is meaningful, non-disruptive citizen participation, and acceptable levels of staff and chief executive involvement—exists to a larger extent in Boston and Seattle than other cities in this study.

In Boston, the Model Neighborhood Board has been given considerable power, yet works well with the city. In sharp contrast to many other communities, the genesis of effective citizen participation here was the community action program, more specifically the Area Planning Action Council (APAC). Four APAC corporations function in various parts of the Model Neighborhood, and they have been unusually cooperative in assisting Model Cities administrators.

The Model Neighborhood Board has developed into a position of strength. However, it has been difficult for it to assimilate a feeling of area-wide interest because of its "elongated doughnut" shape and three distinct neighborhoods. But after some internal power struggles of its own and the resignation of its first chairman, the board was able to establish primacy among local resident groups. Its prestige has evolved far enough along to have developed an "aura of sanctity," and the legitimacy of its decisions are seldom questioned. While other local bodies have had advisory or review powers delegated to them by administrative agreements, the Model Neighborhood Board was uniquely given important decision-making authority by city ordinance. These powers include authority over all Model Cities plans, programs, proposals and contracts, and has made it into a powerful body.

The CDA administrator is obligated to follow the wishes of the majority of the board. If he disagrees he may submit disputes to binding arbitration before three arbitrators—one chosen by the board, one by the administrator, and one by agreement between the two. Surprisingly, no issue has yet had to go as far as arbitration. Usually, consensus is reached through a rationale discussion of differences in community workshops.

Many believe that a principal reason for success is that rhetoric from the board is well chosen, careful, and seldom publically critical of city government or the CDA. The most frequent outbursts have been against the federal government and the Administration's "cynical lack of support" for the Model Cities effort. It shuns radicals. When one black activist organization, RAP, attempted to win some board seats, the group lost badly "because they scared people." Yet, the CDA has assisted groups like the Panthers and Welfare Rights when it felt the projects were justified. It repeatedly states its purpose as "planned constructive social change within the existing political structure." The CDA administrator, Paul Parks, believes that working within the system may be the "main reason this board is more effective than Dayton's"—which has operated too independently.

On the other hand, the board's effectiveness is limited in a number of ways. Its staff is small and the CDA overwhelms it with expertise, making it difficult for members to influence programs and priorities. But it is respected, mostly seeing itself as a change agent and evaluator not an operator of programs. This role may be its most important purpose anyway.

The success of the Model Neighborhood Board may encourage the city to go further. In 1968, Mayor Kevin White appointed a Home

Rule Commission which eventually came forth with recommendations for a system of elected community councils for the entire city—still under consideration by the city and state legislature. And even prior, since 1968, the city has had 14 little city halls which cover the entire city. The mayor would like to see citizen boards developed along side all the little city halls.

Seattle's Parity

Seattle too has a system of parity. Although the Model Cities Citizen Advisory Council has little formal power, it has significant influence. The residents and staff get along well and the mayor shows a sustained interest in the program. Perhaps much of this is so because of an ever present interest in improving the area. For example, the Model Neighborhood has never suffered from lack of organization, with over 100 groups operating there long before Model Cities. Furthermore, residents and the city agreed on their roles from the beginning, and the city made a conscious effort not to oversell the program. The Model Cities Council has been given more power than its name suggests. It can create policy and it can approve plans before submission to the mayor and city council. But city hall has made it clear that it has final control over the program. Instead of wasting time and energy fighting over roles, residents and city hall have concentrated on getting the most out of the role assigned to each.

While in most places boards are elected, in Seattle local organizations choose the racially-mixed, 100-member body. Although no one suggests that such a large board is the best way to operate, its chairman, Judge Charles Johnson, believes the system is satisfactory because a lot of the work gets done through smaller committees. He also feels this board is more effective than that of the local community action program because it has broader representation and is more convincing to the power structure. On the other hand, groups have criticized it for a number of reasons: not electing at least some members, too large and unwieldy, involves too few disadvantaged citizens, and has not legitimized the structure for long-range permanency.

However, some of these things have occurred in other ways. A Model Cities Land Use Review Board, composed of model neighborhood residents, has been given the final decision-making authority all zoning changes and land-use policy in the model neighborhood. There is consensus that "nothing gets done in the model neighborhood without the approval of this board." And under Planned Variations, there has been an expansion of Citizen Advisory Councils to three other model neighborhoods. In addition, an elected Advisory Council—form the four neighborhood councils—has been empowered to consider broader questions.

Meanwhile a Mayor's Task Force is examining the possibility of creating citizen (district) councils in all neighborhoods of the city—to advise the city on such things as general policies, city budget, legislation, and comprehensive development plans submitted by each city department. Besides the neighborhood councils, the mayor and business community are in favor of a citywide (central) council, with representation from all District Councils. Little city halls are also being developed to assist the work of neighborhood councils.

In summary, citizen participation has been healthy for Seattle and for its programs. It has developed new leadership, made citizens more

productive, and created a more positive image of government and its officials.

Conclusions

Measuring the results of citizen participation is difficult. In spite of this there are some clear indications of progress. We have indicated a number of them in the discussion of *product* in this report. But beyond that, citizen participation has sought and found new resident leadership, forced some important changes in government, brought democracy and decision-making closer to the people, and involved at least some of the poor in the actual workings of government. Most importantly, it has created a feeling in large segments of our population that government really cares. As this study shows, there have been successes and failures. Where successes have occurred, the people involved believe their experience to be worthwhile personally and valuable for better government. In the failures, most officials are treating them as temporary and are attempting to find the right mix of ingredients for their particular city or county. Some have given up or are trying to submerge the process so that it is largely meaningless. But one has only to look at cities where residents are actively participating in the processes of Government to feel a spirit and interchange that has never existed before. It is surely a closer step to the democratic principles of this nation.

Some important lessons have been learned about developing the citizen participation mechanism.

Council Size.—In reviewing the cities in this study, as well as some others, a consensus emanates that the most effective citizen board size is a small grouping—usually less than 20 members—because it is more manageable and responsive and members tend to retain greater interest. Naturally, some larger councils succeed, but most experience unnecessary delays, tedious rules and procedures, and greater chance for disruption. Usually large bodies have to be broken down into rather specialized committees anyway, with small executive committees doing most of the work. The main arguemnt for a large body is that broader community representation may be obtained; however, the negative points tend to outweigh this advantage.

Compensating Members.—In regards to compensating members for their services and time, the question is less clear. Citizen councils, like city councils and other boards can be effective with or without pay. Usually other motivations are more important, such as dedication, interest in one's work, and the authority and meaning given to the job. Nevertheless, feelings are strong in favor of paying ordinary residents for their services if we are to be fair, especially in a society which pays elected officials, private corporate board members and others. At the very least, meeting expenses should be reimbursed for low income persons.

Authority and Staff.—Experience shows that citizen participation will be largely meaningless and short lived if the system does not include genuine purpose and authority. It is best that the extent and limit of power be officially established by ordinance, including a clear explanation of the chain-of-command so that there is no question of how plans and policies originate and pass from residents to city hall and on to elected officials. The range of authority should not only include the ability to create specified policies but the flexibility to

operate programs where necessary. Decision-making may involve city budgets, zoning, comprehensive planning, capital improvements, evaluation of services, and other matters important to each neighborhood.

Operations may include multiservice center projects, information and referral, or any service which a citizen group might improve. We have witnessed too many citizen groups which have deteriorated because they did not have project operating responsibilities. First James L. Sundquist, in his *Making Federalism Work*, advocated that Model Cities neighborhood resident organizations be non-operating because he believed their planning and coordinating responsibilities to be incompatible with operations.[2] HUD has pursued the same policy, although some Model Cities resident groups are operating programs anyway. This policy was more appropriate when there were only single neighborhood councils functioning, but under a citywide system, operating projects seem to come natural. We find that certain neighborhood groups are more effective and long-lasting if they are able to operate at least some programs. In any event, coordination is achieved at this level largely through the staffs of agencies in one-stop multiservice centers. It has been difficult for neighborhood councils to achieve areawide coordination from smaller target areas. The most meaningful coordination has occurred at the chief executive level and under the auspices of a citywide citizen body, much different from neighborhood operations. As a practical matter, neighborhood councils should be allowed to operate programs suitable to them, otherwise many of them will not have much reason to exist.

Boards should be provided the resources to hire some staff—either part-time or full-time and in relation to their responsibilities.

Citywide vis-a-vis Target Area Orientation.—The community as a whole should be involved in the participation process if a city expects to reduce alienation and gain support for bond issues and other matters requiring majority approval. There are also good reasons for target area concentration—to allocate resources where they are most needed and to develop leadership where it was non-existent before. However, concentrating resources should not obviate the need to organize and carry on citywide programs. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to develop comprehensive plans and achieve interagency coordination without dealing with problems and issues on a citywide basis.

Citywide Citizen Board.—In addition to neighborhood councils functioning in all areas of the city, one central body—to impact directly on city departments—is desirable for most large jurisdictions. For cities with few neighborhood councils, a central board may not be appealing to them; yet, an effective mechanism is needed to give citizens the opportunity to influence plans and policies right at their inception. Already there are federal requirements for citizen participation in workable (urban renewal) programs, annual arrangements, revenue sharing proposals, and in most other federal grants. Placing the citizen participation responsibility for all these programs in the hands of one representative board makes sense because it reduces duplication and a good deal of confusion.

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[2] *Making Federalism Work*, James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1969. p. 120.

Preferably, the majority of the central body should come from the neighborhood councils and the rest from appointments by the chief executive so that an atmosphere of partnership is created. This body, too, should have some staff but, unlike the neighborhood groups, be non-operating. It should concentrate on developing citywide plans and assisting the city council by helping to draw community consensus on city goals and objectives. It should do such things as conducting periodic neighborhood workshops and monitoring and evaluating city services on a day-to-day basis. It should not be a competitor of the city council. On the contrary, it should be a supplement, doing the kinds of things city council outlines as appropriate to assist council, and at the same time get the average citizen actively involved.

Various city departments, in addition to community development and human resources, ought to be made responsive to the citywide board. It is no longer enough that citizen groups impact only on Model Cities type activities. Community development in fact involves all departments; therefore, all departments should be brought into a more formal system of relating directly with residents.

Selection Process.—The rationalization of how neighborhood councils should be selected is a much more complicated process. In the case of councils with extensive authority, the pure election process may be the best; for others, the combination of eletcion and appointment may be most suitable. In most cases, the decision may very well be left up to each neighborhood; and, neighborhoods should have the right not to participate if they so choose. The combination of election from the neighborhoods and appointment by the chief executive has developed a sense of partnership in many cities. However, where organizations are permitted to choose council members, it is important that opportunity be provided for other residents—who are not organization members—to choose nominees also. Furthermore, it is appropriate that the majority of members be chosen by the residents of the area, that an impartial observer be chosen to oversee the election, and that the entire process be publicized widely.

Voter participation has not been good. A few cities in the Model Cities Program approached 25 percent turnout for elections, two were higher, but on the whole, voting has been poor. However, it has been better than the OEO Community Action Program, which has averaged less than five percent over the life of its program. Critics enjoy pointing to these low vote percentages to support their arguments for resident disinterest and apathy. Yet, to a large extent, residents simply have not been encouraged by the city's leadership to vote or have had little reason to vote for boards relegated little authority. In many instances, local officials had no intention of encouraging massive resident involvement, for fear it might compete with their own political careers. For many it was better to see the process whither away, unless they could control the new system too. It has not been the habit of political figures to encourage the use of television or newspaper publicity, and furthermore, there was little public service time available for neighborhood elections. In addition, elections have been too confining. They have only involved a small section of the community, and few major organizations or the mass media took them seriously. It is more likely that a system of citywide participation would encourage greater interest. It is also desirable that one day be set aside for all neighborhood elections so that a maximum amount of publicity could be obtained.

Leadership from City Hall.—Widespread participation is more likely to come about with official city leadership. A principal fault of most of the Model Cities programs has been the lack of mayoral or administrative leadership—usually over the apprehension of getting involved with activist citizens of different points of view. Yet, to avoid wasteful and unusable creations, election officials should help in molding the system, participate themselves, publicize the purposes, legitimatize the process, and provide leadership and assistance when it is in trouble.

Furthermore, responsive government is not helped by officials who persistently point out that they are the ones elected by the citizens to run the city and that others are not needed. Elections normally come in four year cycles. Meanwhile, citizens need to be involved in important, almost day-to-day decisions of government, otherwise democracy and responsiveness turn out to have little meaning for the average person. Waiting to get back at officials in the next election is not what most people would call citizen participation. More and more chief executives have recognized this and are exercising leadership to genuinely involve citizens. Accordingly, some of them are doing it without prodding from the federal government.

VI. State Action and Private Responses

State Role

Model Cities Emerges as a Catalyst.—Model Cities has demonstrated the need for assistance from other levels of government, including the states and regions. It has been criticized for an inability to coordinate and demand performance of other agencies; yet, cities and states with considerably more stature and power have experienced virtual impotency to do the same, and for a longer period of time. For the most part, regular government has been unable or unwilling to streamline structures, consolidate programs, establish coterminous service districts, or reassign programs to the most effective operating level. In most cases it was not until Model Cities personnel and citizen task forces caused issues to emerge that state and local officials realized the immensity of the problem. Moreover, although there have been some changes, service delivery in health, employment, social service is still the weakest government link. Model Cities surfaced the problem of the lack of intergovernmental response but has never been the appropriate body to do much about it. Nevertheless, state and local cooperation reached its highest peak during the Model Cities Program. It remains for the more powerful to take the next steps.

The Power of the State.—There appears to be little question that the states need to take a stronger role in the development of intergovernmental cooperation and more effective local governments. They already have the power. In most cases, an act of the legislature can bring consolidation or strong regional government. The legislature can abolish special districts and transfer their power and indebtedness to city, county, or regional governments. It can designate COGs as operating agencies for such things as mass transit, water and sewer control, air pollution enforcement, housing development or regionally oriented functions. Legislatures of two or more states can enter into compacts to give combined power to the regional council of government. The governor, by executive order, can direct his cabinet heads or department directors to meet in the form of regional bodies to coordinate functions and consolidate staff and facilities. He can appoint one of these persons in each region as chairman (to whom others report) and he can use state funds or federal monies (which pass through the state) as incentives to encourage local government cooperation. Furthermore, the federal government can help the states by using a large block of incentive money to be awarded to the regions and localities which show the most progress. Washington should also consider awarding special grants similar to that proposed for local government to increase state government capacity. Attaching specific performance requirements to revenue sharing bills for both the states and localities would be helpful, but this has been proposed before in Congress and has not seen the light of day.

In the past several years, states have begun to do something about their own problems. Many have created planning districts throughout

the state and have given new authority to state regional officials to act. California, for example, has established planning councils in every section of the state. Texas has gone one step further by giving the councils the authority to allocate resources. Many of the states where there are active Model Cities programs have established task forces and commissions to help solve coordinating problems. But the whole question of reorganization and consolidation is still on fertile soil. Meanwhile, some states are helping their Model City communities in other ways.

The Level of State Participation

Most states contributed at least technical assistance to Model Cities communities. Some gave extra resources through various means, such as increasing the number of state workers in the model area, awarding extra grants, and building additional facilities, which ordinarily would have gone elsewhere.

Newark Gained.—In Newark's case, because of the city's generally depressed condition, the state doubled Urban Aid to the city to $7.4 million annually. It also has been providing $9.25 million annually for the operation of Martland Hospital, a city owned facility. Legislation was also passed to allow the city to impose new taxes on its own. And New Jersey's Community Affairs Department has been particularly helpful. It awarded $60,000 in initial Model Cities planning funds and $100,000 for the first action year. State specialists have been assigned to Newark's program fulltime. Moreover, the city received technical assistance and planning grants from the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency (SLEPA) and the Regional Medical Program.

In addition, New Jersey has assisted the city by (1) beginning construction of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry (a project delayed since 1967); (2) transplanting an entire public health staff to Newark to assist in the construction of a public health system; and (3) picking up much of the local share on projects which it administered itself, but which would never have functioned if Newark had to provide the funds. However, even with this involvement, actual coordinating mechanisms between the state and city are wanting, nor have formal links been established that can stand on their own and carry on for the long-term future.

Chicago Unresponsive.—In Illinois, it has been somewhat different. With a Republican administration in control of the State House during most of the life of Chicago's Model Cities Program, and a strong city Democratic organization, state and local relationships were held to a minimum. Mayor Daley would not tolerate any "interference" from state or federal officials. Nevertheless, he was particularly disturbed about not getting a "fair share" of state tax distributions to the city. In 1972, he estimated that although Chicago residents and businessmen paid half of the state income tax, only 2.6 percent was returned to the city. (Mayor Lindsay and other big city mayors have presented similar arguments.) However, the aid to Chicago has increased dramatically in the last several years—from $68.6 million in 1968 to $139 million in 1972—because of the state income tax and increased returns on water, fuel and sales taxes.

During Governor Ogilvie's Administration, attempts were made to assist Chicago in a number of areas—including Model Cities—but it

was difficult to tamper even lightly on Daley's soil. Yet, aid has been channeled to some city programs. Two Model Cities projects—Day Care and Police Community Services—receive funds on a three (state) to one (city) matching basis. Also, Chicago received most of the $19 million in state aid made available in 1972 throughout Illinois to model neighborhoods and public housing projects. Without state aid, several Chicago Model Cities projects and many other Model Cities projects throughout the state could not continue.

Without question, the state of Illinois was attracted to doing a great deal more about urban problems because of the investment of the federal government in the model neighborhoods. This involvement consisted of financial aid, technical assistance and organizational improvements. Although organizational changes, such as joint local and state coordinating task forces were not developed in Chicago, they were created in other Model Cities communities in Illinois and at least reached the first plateau of success, largely because the governor wanted them to be successful and because he directed his regional directors to actively participate.

There was a substantive amount of money and other forms of State assistance invested in the Model Cities communities in Illinois. This would not have occurred without federal intervention, which created the necessary resource base and, guaranteed the federal government's sharing in local, urban adventures.

New York Sidetracked.—On the other side, New York City has been considerably less successful in getting state assistance. Political differences between Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Mayor John Lindsay have not helped matters. Rockefeller maintains Lindsay is an incompetent administrator and has brought disaster to New York; Lindsay attributes similar incompetence to the Governor. Unfortunately, this careless display of politics has hurt service and dwindled resources to the city, as one politician has tried to undermine another. Naturally the clients have been hurt the most.

Having felt itself being left behind, the city began to take steps to help correct the situation. Model Cities established a division of Federal/State Relations because of evidence that the city was not getting its fair share of state funds. For example, in 1970 the city only received $2.5 million (or 18 percent) of $23,952,948 in HEW money distributed by the state, yet it had 90 percent of the state's educationally disadvantaged, 62 percent of the economically disadvantaged children, 58 percent of all high school dropouts, and 50 percent of all jobs in the state. And of the total state and federal allotment of $74 million, the city was getting only ten percent. The state's jusification was that the city had not developed the necessary administrative apparatus to operate sound programs. Nevertheless, the city's efforts paid off. Under leadership of the Model Cities division of Federal/State Relations and important local congressional assistance, the city's share of HEW money was increased to $4.5 million in fiscal 1971, a substantial improvement.

State distrust of the Lindsay administration has been further demonstrated by the creation of the New York State Urban Development Corporation, which has taken the initiative away from the city in the development of housing and economic projects. For example, it is developing one of the nation's largest and most publicized projects, the

$325 million Welware Island apartment and commercial complex in the heart of New York City. Clearly, state aid is coming in forms that give credit to the State and not Lindsay. Moreover, the state legislature, which has veto power over every city budget expenditure, has cut many health and education programs at the city's poor neighborhoods. Thus, in the last two years, Model Cities money has become more important for filling gaps created by reduced appropriations—with the city merely trying to maintain ongoing programs. This naturally has had the effect of limiting the choices for the use of Model Cities funds and has seriously hurt the programs' ability to demonstrate innovative results, even with a new source of flexible money.

Seattle Benefited.—Seattle has received strong response from the state, even though it has been mainly in the form of technical assistance. At the beginning of Model Cities, Governor Dan Evans appointed six principal Washington state officials—from Employment Security, Public Assistance, State Planning, State OEO, and from Evan's personal staff—to assist the city in developing the program. As a result, Seattle was able to develop the Model Cities/State Interagency Team and certain other coordinating mechanisms, such as the City Interdepartmental Team, Seattle-King County Economic Opportunity Board Liaison, and the Advisory Council Resource Committee. In turn, this led Model Cities to develop a Department of Governmental Relations, designed to consolidate efforts at cooperation, and, also an Interagency Directors Committee, to involve agencies more closely in local project planning and implementation.

Although far from ideal, coordination and cooperation between the state and city have improved immeasurably over the past several years. For example, Model Cities and the State Department of Social and Health Services staffs prepared joint grant applications for integrated services to Seattle's Skid Road area; and the Governor's State Model Cities Office was instrumental in the award of a federal grant to the State Child Care Coordination Committee for technical assistance to Model Cities for the development of a comprehensive plan for child care. Agency after agency has provided assistance to the city; moreover, Seattle Model Cities has been praised for its genius in motivating other agencies and institutions to help it. Finally, the creation of the State-City Task Force (which includes county and private agencies) has advanced coordination even further and among more organizations.

Boston Passable Assistance.—Some states have limited their participation. The State of Massachusetts' involvement in Model Cities has been very sporadic. The State Department of Community Affairs has offered only peripheral technical assistance to Boston, and most state funds to the city have simply consisted of the formal pass-through type. There has never been a single effective point at which the CDA could approach the state; therefore, Model Cities Director Paul Parks has had to negotiate trade-offs with state officials to gain assistance—a game at which he is very adept. The hope for improved coordination and cooperation lies in the city's Office of Planning and Program Coordination, which has profited from Model Cities experience and is now assuming much of the city's coordinative role.

Dayton Standard Assistance.—Ohio too has not participated in an integral way. Dayton has received only minor assistance from the

State. However, the lessons of Model Cities and Planned Variations are changing this. Through the creation of a State-City Task Force, the State now plans to use Dayton as a model for demonstrating maximum coordination of state programs in an urban area. Also, the State Department of Urban Affairs and the Ohio Law Enforcement Planning Agency are providing important funding to Dayton. Nevertheless, financial assistance has been limited to a few functional areas. Mostly on its own, Dayton has been able to achieve modest success in coordinating social service agencies. The Model Cities head of social services, for example, now chairs the Health and Welfare Planning Council's Comprehensive Coordinated Child Care body. But employment agencies—in particular State Bureau of Employment Services, National Alliance of Businessmen, OIC, etc.—continue to experience major problems associated with red tape and bureaucratic defenses. On the other hand, the Model Cities Planning Council has established good relationships with two other planning bodies—the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission and the Transportation Coordinating Committee. Prior to Model Cities, there was little headway with these bodies.

Indianapolis and Savannah Minimum Assistance.—The States of Indiana and Georgia have participated in a minimal way. In Indianapolis, the State has limited itself to giving technical endorsement and operating a few programs in the model neighborhood. Private agencies also have not been enthusiastic about assisting the Model Cities Program.

In Savannah, the A-95 review process has forced the State to become more deeply involved. However, at least one problem—coordination—is not nearly as serious in this region as elsewhere because there are only eight communities in the metropolitan area to coordinate. And greater state participation is beginning to take place under Governor Jimmy Carter, who has committed himself to the concept of area-wide planning and community action and who is taking the lead to increase state funding and technical assistance to model neighborhoods in the State.

Local Strategies and State Plans

The scope of problems associated with the Model Cities communities clearly indicate the need for cities to develop intergovernmental relations techniques. Cities need to develop adequate staffs and input into the state system. Some Model Cities communities have developed such capacity, passing it on to local government. In any case, staffs (which may consist of as little as one person) should become thoroughly familiar with state, regional, and local plans, normally required for most federal programs. In order to develop an effective level of cooperation, state and local staffs, usually by means of the State's Community Affairs Department, should see that state plans and legislation include the following items:[1] (1) State notification of all units of local government about the availability of formula grant money and how to apply for it. (A simple point of entry for federal money to the states would also be helpful.) (2) Distribution of funds based on need factors, such as urban and rural geography,

[1] HUD gives an explanation of some of the main elements of state-local cooperation in its Community Development Evaluation Series No. 3, *Local Strategies to Affect State Plans Allocation of Federal Funds*, January, 1972.

poverty, welfare clients, unemployed, aged, youth and other matters peculiar to disadvantaged areas. (3) Establishment of specific criteria for funding priorities, and the passing of a fixed percentage of state funds to local governments so that the latter can better plan their own strategies. (4) Requirements that matching fund criteria be flexible enough so that financially strapped communities can meet them. (5) Legislative provision permitting localities to challenge provisions they believe unfair. (6) State control of the informational process in order to keep localities fully informed of all programs affecting them; and the authority for localities to review and sign-off on such projects. (7) Legislative mandate for local (regional and/or city-county)—state coordinating commissions (fully staffed) in principal functional areas, such as employment, social services, criminal justice and corrections, finance and government organization. (8) Incentive (or discretionary) funding to localities based on performance, improved government organization, and greater regional cooperation.

Private Response

The solution to urban problems involves more than the need for federal and state government action. It also requires private response, which has been lacking in almost all Model Cities communities. The participation of business and union interests has been extremely poor. Too often these interests have not wanted to get involved in local conflicts and what they thought were strictly government problems anyway. On the other hand, private service agencies have been somewhat different. Since many were already involved in urban matters, they readily accepted Model Cities money which they badly needed and which intensified their involvement.

The lessons of Model Cities indicate that few urban problems will be solved without the genuine participation of businessmen and union leaders and private agency heads. However, it is unlikely they will get involved unless the local chief executive is able to motivate them, and state officials, particularly the Governor and key legislators, are able to demonstrate sincerity and leadership in establishing formal mechanisms for coordination, cooperation, and investment. Furthermore, it seems clear that both federal and state funds are necessary to create the proper investment base and incentives on which private interests will chance their money.

Private investment is more likely to come about in the urban ghetto if certain things occur. Local government needs to take steps to develop a comprehensive plan, city goals, and a mechanism to pass bond issues. In this study, the most successful example of private initiative is Seattle's Forward Thrust. This is a group of business and civic leaders who have been instrumental in getting millions of dollars in bond issues approved and legislation (important to the city) passed. It has received over $529,999 in private contributions from more than 1,000 businesses and individuals. Its impressive record of accomplishments include assisting in passage of 20 measures through the state legislature on highways, mass transit, pollution control, and strengthened city and county finances; helping to pass seven major city and county bond issues totalling $333.9 million and two state bond issues for $65 million for local capital improvements; helping to pass state legislation for revenue sharing to localities; and developing numerous

joint planning projects and more efficient methods of operating local government. It is now pushing for 25 community centers, neighborhood library facilities, and other human resource projects.

Although not a part of this study, the Hartford Process—a coalition of concerned metropolitan area (Hartford, Connecticut) business and civic leaders who have contributed financial resources and talent for the development of comprehensive community goals and growth plans—is another excellent example of the mobilization of private forces. If cities were able to combine such movements as Forward Thrust and the Hartford Process with community development strategy, a giant step would be taken to solving our most pressing urban problems. At least, many cities now realize the significance of combining these processes. Furthermore, the experiences gained through the trials and errors of Model Cities have pinpointed many of the ingredients necessary for success.

VII. Federal Role in the Future

There will always be a federal role in local and state government affairs. Public employment policies, environmental laws, civil rights legislation, mortgage assistance, and a host of other things will make the federal government's presence felt. Nevertheless, although the cities and counties expect continued federal involvement, they are not particularly pleased with increased state intervention for fear it may create another bureaucratic nightmare. Yet we have described areas where cooperation is essential; otherwise little progress will occur. As it happens, most localities are willing to work with the federal government because of increased funding and the prodding they receive to engage in policies they would not ordinarily want or dare to assume responsibility for at home. The states can probably work themselves into similar positions in respect to local government by increasing state aid and improving their own organizations. Meanwhile if the federal government intends to maintain or increase its credibility, it will have to simplify its procedures and offer greater technical and financial assistance.

We have already discussed some newer federal methods for improving local government capacity, including annual arrangements, Chief Executive Review and Comment, Federal Regional Councils, and other assistance. The effectiveness of these devices would be improved significantly by a more streamlined flow of funds and less diffused direction from both the federal and state levels. The block grant system is one way of doing this. In addition, a commitment of an effective level of national revenue for community development is needed, as well as support from the public, both financial and civic.

Block Grants

Perhaps the most effective way to improve coordination is to consolidate programs. Block grants might best be able to do this from the federal to the state and local levels. Numerous federal and local administrators as well as principal city and county service organizations have endorsed this approach.

Recently the International City Management Association (ICMA) advocated the adoption of block grants because of the almost impossible task of coordinating and scheduling federal projects at the local level.[1] For example, under categorical grants, for a project that involves urban renewal, open space, and water and sewer grants, a city or county needs to follow three different application procedures dealing with three sets of HUD officials, three sets of technical requirements, three piles of paper, and three different time schedules. They would like to see this nightmare eliminated and post-controls instituted, the latter which would have the further effect of reducing red-tape and yet providing needed safeguards.

[1] Statement before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hugh McKinley on behalf of International City Management Association, July 19, 1973.

Planned Variations as a Block Grant.—Both the Model Cities and Planned Variations Programs offer some valuable experience about what may be expected from block grants and other relatively new ideas. Planned Variations was designed to correct many of the faults of the Model Cities Program and at the same time serve as an introduction to special revenue sharing. It resulted from a review of the Model Cities Program early in 1970 by the President's Domestic Council and closely followed the Administration's efforts to reorganize federal agencies. Sixteen cities have been receiving funds which will total $157.2 million over a two-year period or longer and are participating in three variations which include: (1) extending programming citywide, (2) minimizing red-tape and federal reviews, and (3) providing stronger mayoral coordinating power through the CERC process.

In a HUD first year study of Planned Variations, the findings indicate a number of changes from the original Model Cities Program: (1) Federal restraints have been reduced, most resource allocation has been placed in the hands of the chief executive, and priorities have changed from social to physical programming (43 percent in physical programs compared to 21 percent under Model Cities). (2) Federal response has mostly been aimed at simplifying procedures.[2] Handbooks have been simplified and the average size of applications has been reduced by 75 percent (399 pages in Model Cities compared to 102 in Planned Variations); however, processing time has remained unchanged from one and one-half to three months. Only four cities have used the "waivers" process, created to allow cities to identify unnecessary administrative requirements in categorical programs. And the Federal Regional Councils have only moderately supported the program. It has been the "hands-off" policy of the area physical offices which has resulted in greater local discretion and control than anything else. (3) CERC has stimulated the development of citywide strategies, and as a result, some cities have made major departmental reorganizations. Intergovernmental task forces have only been partly successful in gaining state and county support. County involvement has been minimal because they prefer that more money and influence be given directly to them. (4) Citizen participation has taken on a different character, becoming more advisory and taking on a more traditional "blue ribbon" air in about half the cities, over the protests of existing model neighborhood groups. The chief executives now appoint a greater percentage of Model Cities board members.[3]

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[2] The Federal Assistance Review (FAR) program, begun in March 1969, aimed at improving federal response by (1) placing greater reliance on state and local governments; (2) increasing inter-departmental coordination; and (3) reducing red tape and speeding services. This resulted in only modest success. It was apparent more drastic measures were needed.

[3] Planned Variations First Year Survey, Community Development Evaluation Series No. 7, Department of Housing and Urban Development, October, 1972, pp. 1-58.

TABLE IV. ANNUAL FUNDING FOR PLANNED VARIATIONS CITIES

Region and city	Regular MC funding	PV increases of MC funding	Total MC funding
II:			
Newark	$5.7	$7.9	$12.7
Paterson	2.1	4.1	6.2
III:			
Erie	1.6	2.9	4.5
Norfolk	4.5	8.0	12.5
IV:			
Tampa	4.1	7.1	11.2
Winston-Salem	1.9	3.3	5.2
V:			
Dayton	2.9	5.2	8.1
East St. Louis	2.1	3.8	5.9
Indianapolis	6.2	8.5	14.7
Lansing	1.9	3.3	5.2
VI: Waco	2.6	4.6	7.2
VII: Des Moines	2.1	3.7	5.8
VIII: Butte	1.7	1.5	3.2
IX:			
Fresno	2.8	4.9	7.7
Tucson	3.1	5.5	8.6
X: Seattle	5.2	5.2	10.4
II: Rochester (CERC only)	3.0	.2	3.2
III: Wilmington (CERC only)	1.7	.2	1.9
VI: Houston (CERC only)	13.4	.2	13.6
IX: San Jose (CERC only)	3.1	.2	3.3
Total	71.7	79.4	151.1

Source: Community Development Evaluation Series No. 7, Department of Housing and Urban Development, October 1972

Model Cities: Block Grants and Commitment.—Although new problems may arise in the administration of block grants, the wisdom of the flexible use of funds has already been demonstrated. In the Model Cities Program officials have been able to use funds for almost any purpose to meet broad goals and objectives developed through comprehensive planning. It has been primarily through this system that city officials have been able to look seriously at the totality of community problems and spend money as they see fit. The ability to use funds broadly has encouraged city officials to tackle unusual problems in formerly "restricted" area. The desirability to continue this motivating catalyst seems obvious. If it is not done through some system of special revenue sharing or block grants, strong arguments can be made for continuing the Model Cities or Planned Variations approach to maintain the momentum for governmental improvement and responsiveness.

Pending Legislation.—There have been a number of bills introduced to consolidate categorical grants for community development purposes. The latest administration bill is the Better Communities Act (BCA—introduced in the House of Representatives as HR 7277, April 19, 1973 and in the Senate as S 1743, May 8, 1973), which differs considerably from 1971 special revenue sharing proposals. The new bill includes the following major differences (1) A poverty factor is now included in the formula. This is similar to the 1972 House and Senate block grant bills; however, BCA does not include "past performance" or "housing condition" factors which Congressional leaders would like to see. (2) Counties over 200,000 and cities over 50,000 population (or designated center city) are now automatically included. This means that many jurisdictions will be included which have little or no need for this type of funding, which will simply decrease the amount

of money high priority areas need. (3) Hold harmless protection for cities now participating would be phased out over four years and new communities would be phased in over three years. This means many communities in dire need would be getting less money after hold harmless runs out. (4) States are automatically entitled to funds for which cities under 50,000 population would be eligible to apply.

There are other differences and controversial elements. The new bill does not require a formal application from cities or counties, nor does it require the spending of funds in matters of national priority. This is in sharp contrast to both last year's and 1973 Congressional bills which require a plan and an application designed to eliminate and prevent blight, to facilitate additional housing opportunities, and to provide community facilities. BCA does require an annual statement of community development objectives, past-performance statements, and an evaluation of effectiveness. However, the chief complaint from Congressional critics is that without a specific plan no work will get done toward meeting national or local priorities. Furthermore the Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO) are afraid that the Nixon Administration's requirements for performance evaluation are weak and non-enforceable.

There are other difficulties as well. The Better Communities Act proposes to terminate seven categorical programs, while Congress wishes to leave some of these programs alone. The 1972 Congressional bills did not consolidate Model Cities; also, the Senate bill excluded Section 312 rehabilitation grants and the House bill excluded water and sewer programs. Another major criticism by Congressional leaders is that BCA does not contain any linkage between community development and housing programs. Finally, BCA has no requirement for local financial sharing, no citizen participation, no A–95 review, and no workable program.[4]

In spite of these difficulties, there appears to be general agreement from all sources that a more simplified method of channeling federal funds to the states and localities is needed. Most officials feel the need for grantsmanship should be reduced and that cities and counties should be allocated funds based on real needs. Let us look in more detail at three aspects of the proposed Better Communities Act which would severely hurt community development: (1) funds for many cities would be cut; (2) there would be fewer incentives for local officials to face up to poverty and discrimination; and (3) citizens would not be effectively involved.

1. *The Distribution Formula.*—The distribution formula needs changing if the most disadvantaged areas are to benefit. The proposed formula—based on (1) size of population, (2) extent of housing overcrowding, and (3) extent of poverty—does not truly reflect neighborhood deterioration and poverty in most cases. The size of population bears no relationship to the poverty population. Secondly, figures on overcrowding and substandard units in poverty areas of the 100 largest SMSA's reveal no direct correlation between the "extent of overcrowding" and physical condition.[5] In fact, says Richard T. LeGates and

[4] Most of the above major points of discussion were derived from *Better Communities Act—HR 7277*, John Maguire, Director, National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials Information Center for Community Development, *Journal of Housing*, No. 5, pp. 222–223, May 1973.

[5] U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, 1968, Table 8, pp. 14–18.

Mary C. Morgan in a recent issue of the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, the most deteriorated urban areas do not have high incidences of overcrowding. Furthermore, they indicate that although the "extent of poverty" is a valid measure of need, and "double weighting" of this indicator is useful, it makes little difference because of the nature of the formula. The wide range of population ratios in the various SMSA's minimize the significance of double weighting the poverty indicator.[6] Because of the formula's automatic nature, most of the largest deteriorated urban areas will most likely receive less money than under the categorical system. Moreover, comprehensive planning and quality of life goals would probably be even less meaningful (than under Model Cities), without the necessary funds to implement programs.

2. *Maintenance of Effort.*—Because the Better Communities legislation does not require local matching or maintenance of local effort, it is likely many communities will simply use federal funds as a substitute for local money already allocated for some of these services. Therefore, urban areas may not only experience an eventual loss of funds but less incentives to use money in the disadvantaged areas. LeGates and Morgan point out that many of the programs now administered with federal funds would not be carried out if local officials and communities had to decide the priorities by direct vote. Certainly, the poverty areas would suffer.

3. *Citizen Involvement.*—Citizen participation requirements in the Better Communities Act are very similar to the past rather poor experiences with public hearings in transportation and urban renewal programs. Minorities fear that revenue sharing funds will be given right back to the very officials, in many cases, who have been "racist in the first place" and disinterested in improving the lot of the poor. As we have pointed out for example, the Annual Arrangement process has demonstrated only minimal and infrequent citizen involvement and many of the Planned Variations cities have changed their citizen participants from policymakers to advisors.

The Congress and community groups do not want to take any chances about leaving the idea of resident participation up to local officials. The Senate more than the House has taken a leading role in this, adding amendments to the proposed special revenue sharing legislation. For example, the language in Senate Bill 3248, passed March 2, 1972 (but left out by the House), is believed by federal Community Development officials to be stronger than the original Model Cities language. It reads as follows in regards to the cities' obligation to carry out the bill's mandates: ". . . has afforded adequate opportunity for citizen participation in the development of the annual application and has provided for the meaningful involvement of the residents of areas in which community development activities are to be concentrated in the planning and execution of these activities, including the provision of adequate information and resources." [7]

The bill is stronger for two reasons: (1) it provides for meaningful resident involvement in all areas (not just the model area) of the city

[6] "The Perils of Special Revenue Sharing for Community Development," Richard T. LeGates and Mary C. Morgan, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, July, 1973, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 257–258.

[7] Senate Bill S. 3248 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1972, passed March 2, 1972, Sec. 307(a)(3)(c) pp. 151–152.

where any significant community development activities are to take place, and (2) it calls for adequate information and resources to enable citizens to do their part. (Original Model Cities legislation did not specially call for the provision of adequate resources.)

Providing adequate resources may be the most important element because it gives citizens the ability to develop technical and political know-how to carry out strategies. Moreover, if residents are to be given resources, it makes it all the more important that local officials devise participation plans that are meaningful and workable so that funds will be used to the best advantage. Federal encouragement to do nothing about citizen participation can only cause frustration and further alienation among local groups. It would be foolhardy to dictate plans of participation to localities; however, guidelines of successful experiences would be helpful. Furthermore, if genuine and widespread local decision-making is to take place, there is an obligation on the part of the nation's leaders to encourage more effective democratic processes and also to indicate the desirable levels and kinds of participation.

Commitment

Even with block grants it seems probable that Congress will continue to appropriate funds for projects to meet special Congressional objectives. Thus, a system of block grants (in all major functional areas) could provide the basis for a coordinated, more simplified method for dealing with the cities' problems at the same time other funds are used as incentives and for expediting programs. As a practical matter, categorical funding in our political system seems here to stay. Possibly, the best we can hope for is the consolidation of some categorical grants or funding of a variety of grants through multi-applications.

Furthermore, because of the minimal level of funding requested for community development and its wide dispersal to over 1200 cities and counties, urban pressures will mount for the executive branch and the Congress to approve separate blocks of funds in order to make goals and plans realistic. The magnitude of these demands might very well be double what is now being spent in the urban areas, or an additional $35 or 40 billion annually. For example, the preliminary comprehensive plan in Dorchester (a district within Boston of about 130,000 residents) projects a minimum expenditure of $50 million annually for the next ten years, exclusive of housing mortgages.[8] This can be effectively multiplied 700 to 800 times in the United States, taking into account large and small areas of need. We know that under Model Cities the comitment of funds never approached the threshold necessary to cope with the extent of the problem. Proposed funding under block grants does not do it either; therefore, special purpose grants and different formulas will most likely emerge. This will be especially true if Congress demands that the cities and counties prepare realistic applications and that evaluations be sufficiently stringent to enable the federal government to initiate penalties and enforce compliance.

Under conditions where local officials demonstrate adequate performance, the federal government and taxpayer will be more likely

[8] *Dorchester Comprehensive Community Project*, Dorchester Area Planning Action Council, Doris Graham, Executive Director, January 24, 1973.

to pass on the vast amounts of money needed to solve the urban crisis. Performance will not necessarily improve merely by giving local officials greater discretionary authority, even though allowing the city to devise its own process of implementation is a good idea. Strengthening the chief executive through the devices already discussed and designing policy and information systems which make city councils cooperative partners, not antagonists, are important. Setting up a "talent bank" on the scale, for example, used to recruit the best skills available for the nation's aerospace programs is needed for the cities. And further, consideration ought to be given to sending teams of experts (both government and private) into cities for long periods of time (two or three years or longer) to solve special problems and complete troubled projects, and then pass on to other cities.

The nation cannot afford to let even one city fail. On the other hand, the withholding of assistance will be necessary to secure compliance in many cases, even if only temporary. The fears of government leaders (and GAO monitors) are real in regard to non-performance, political interference, and favoritism. The way that we can face up to matters of performance and reaching goals is to bring them to public attention and then concentrate full efforts on achieving them. Community participation, management capacity and new organizational techniques are all necessary elements for improving performance. However, in the past, many of the deficiencies found in Model Cities and other community development programs have been generated by feelings of failure and lack of national purpose and general public intrest. This needs to be changed.

There are many local and federal leaders who feel confident about the nation's technical ability to solve the urban crisis. Assuredly, the problems are complex—full employment, crime reduction, meeting housing needs, gaining community support, etc. Nevertheless, the only way they will be solved is by focusing leadership on the problems and persistently trying alternative solutions. In short, there needs to be a national pledge to reach goals, a willingness to accept failures, make corrections and move ahead again, regardless of the differences in political styles and governmental processes. As yet we have not made the necessary commitments, either in purpose or resources. Model Cities provided initial momentum in small geographic areas. This could very well dissolve away, and the investment with it, if we fail to appreciate the significance of the Model Cities experiment.